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INTROdUCTION
In her keynote address to the Institute of Women’s Studies 2012 
conference, Professor Saba Mahmoud (University of California, 
Berkeley), took the audience on a far-ranging intellectual 
journey with the aim of re-thinking “the nexus between family 
law, gender and sectarian conflict.” Beginning with a detailed 
examination of recent incidents of Coptic-Muslim conflict in 
Egypt, sparked by interreligious marriage and claims of the 
abduction and conversion of Coptic women, Mahmoud then 
analyzed how “the gendered and sexualized dimensions of 
interreligious conflict… are best understood as a product of the 
unique paradoxes produced by the simultaneous privatization 
of sexuality and religion under the modern post- colonial state.” 
Placing religion-based family law as a component of the modern 
national project, rather than an archaic remnant of patriarchy, 
Mahmoud showed that “getting right women’s rights’’ – the 
title of the 2012 conference – required grappling with complex 
issues, including “the secular”, which she termed religion’s 
“Siamese twin.” 
An excellent example of addressing the complexity of 
“getting right women’s rights” is Professor Hoda Elsadda’s 
important intervention on women’s rights activism in post-
January 25 Egypt which she has kindly allowed the Review to 
re-publish. She points to the backlash against women’s rights 
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and in particular against Mubarak-era reforms of family law which are termed 
by opponents “Suzanne’s laws,” after the former and much despised First Lady. 
“Combatting the First Lady syndrome,” Elsadda argues, means re-claiming the 
long history of independent women’s activism. 
The titles and programs of the Institute of Women’s Studies last two annual 
conferences (2011 and 2012) speaking tellingly of scholars and activists seeking 
to understand the complicated trajectory of law and gender justice in Palestine 
(and elsewhere) in a Palestine under colonial control, in an imperial globe, and 
in a rapidly shifting region. The 2011 conference, entitled “Re-thinking Gender 
and Governance in an Age of Empire,” opened with two keynotes that provided 
two productive and stimulating, but quite different, paradigms, one creatively 
deploying contemporary political theory and the other developmental and 
rights-based discourses. Rema Hammami, a faculty member at the Institute, 
gave a compelling portrait of the “politics of life and death” in Palestine and 
argued for its global significance. In this issue of the Review, we feature a brief 
intervention by Hammami, based on her presentation, that asks “Governance or 
Governmentality?” and compellingly argues for the latter as she reflects on the 
Palestinian Authority. We hope “Interventions” will be a regular feature of the 
Review and invite contributions.
Aruna Rao, in her 2011 keynote address on “Gender and Governance, 
Claiming Rights in Post-Colonial Contexts,” shares Hammami’s concern that 
discourses and practices of “governance” need to be unpacked (and are certainly 
not “gender-neutral”) and colonial legacies and post-colonial realities taken 
into account. Nonethless, she takes gender and governance as a starting point 
to argue for an integrated approach to institutional change, providing working 
models from her long experience in gender and development. Rao and another 
keynote speaker, Kalyani Menon, brought a welcome lens on gender scholarship 
and activism from India and Southeast Asia to Palestine, and further exchanges 
and discussions are very much on the agenda. A slightly shortened version of 
Menon’s dissection of the Indian economic project – “Shining India” – and her 
examination of an accompanying rise in violence against women, throws light 
on the consequences of a key neoliberal project in today’s globalized economies.
In the 2012 conference, Professor Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian examined 
another form of violence as sanctioned and implemented by current Israeli 
legislation forbidding Palestinian spouses from the West Bank and Gaza from 
residing with their partners in Israel, including East Jerusalem. Her dissection 
of Israeli discourse around the 2003 Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law and 
its amendments, and her interviews with Palestinian women living the law’s 
consequences, incisively showed both law as a destroyer of family relations 
and intimate life and the intricate twinning of a “theology of security” and a 
demographic agenda underpinning this racialized law.
 7
Finally, Penny Johnson’s contribution to the 2011 conference complements 
Rema Hammami’s analysis of “governmentality” and the Palestinian Authority 
with a presentation focusing on the re-configuration of the Palestinian social 
contract in the troubled post-Oslo terrain, looking at the emergence of “the 
poor” and the movement of political prisoners to the margins of the unsovereign 
Authority and the Palestinian political project. 
In the Arabic section, which also features a translation of Professor Saba 
Mahmoud’s 2012 keynote, Reem Botmeh of Birzeit’s Institute of Law reviews and 
evaluates key pieces of Palestinian legislation from a women’s rights perspective, 
arguing that “legal reform must take place hand-in-hand with broader initiatives 
for change if it is to be an effective tool for tackling gender inequality.” Ala 
Azza, a lecturer in anthropology at Birzeit University, delivered a 2011 keynote 
that argued for an alternative paradigm of civil society that is unlinked from 
governance models and statist structures (including of course the Israeli 
occupation). Azza pointed to the experience of the first Palestinian intifada in 
proposing that Palestinian society could direct its own affairs and suggested that 
work proceed on a local, voluntary basis. Also in the 2011 conference, political 
scientist Mtanes Shehadeh, a researcher with Mada-Karmel in Haifa, discussed 
the economic situation of Arab women in Israel – and in particular in the city 
of Jaffa – and linked their marginalization both to Israeli policies of housing and 
urban planning and to the consequences of economic globalization, a factor, he 
noted, that has not been addressed in local research. And finally, in the 2012 
conference, Maha Abu Dayyeh, the director of the Women’s Center for Legal 
Aid and Counselling, reflected on post-Oslo gender legal strategies, enumerating 
strategies, achievements and failures. 
The 2011 conference concluded with a roundtable of testimonies from 
Sheikh Jarrah by women from the Al-Ghawi, Hanun and Al-Kurd family fighting 
the dispossession of their families from their homes by a powerful Israeli settler 
movement. The roundtable and a visit to Sheikh Jarrah prompted Kalyani Sen-
Menon to write a moving and incisive article on Palestinian women resisting 
eviction for an Indian periodical (now posted on our website) that both shows the 
ties of solidarity that academic exchange can forge and offers a lesson of resistance 
in our time. The title of her article are the words of Mayssa al Kurd: “We will 
weep but we will stay.”

ARTICLES
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Sectarian Conflict and Family Law  
in Contemporary Egypt
Re-thinking the Privatization of Sexuality  
and Religion in the Post-colonial State
Saba Mahmood
Although Saba Mahmood was unable to travel to Ramallah for 
her keynote speech at the Institute’s 2012 conference due to medical 
reasons, Mahmoud, an Associate Professor of Anthropology at 
the University of California, Berkeley, spoke via video link from 
her office, followed by a lively question and answer period. Her 
rich and complex presentation, which the Institute also publishes 
here in Arabic, explores a key site of conflict between Muslims 
and Copts in Egypt – interreligious marriage and conversion. 
She offers a detailed examination of these conflicts, in particular 
accusations of the abduction and conversion of women, and 
convincingly shows that they are concretely grounded in a “crisis 
in Coptic divorce,” but also reveal a “fundamental tension 
intrinsic to the project of modern nationalism.” Mahmoud 
rethinks, in her words, “the nexus between family, law, gender 
and sectarian conflict through the examination of both the 
history of Egyptian family law and the simultaneous relegation 
of religion and sexuality to the private sphere in the modern 
period.” The Institute of Women’s Studies thanks Saba and 
the American Ethnologist for permission to publish “Sectarian 
conflict and family law in contemporary Egypt,” which appeared 
under that title in American Ethnologist, Volume 39, No. 1. 
In the months following the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, Egypt has 
witnessed a number of violent clashes between Coptic Christians and Muslims 
that challenge the much-celebrated Coptic–Muslim solidarity that was on display 
during the protests leading up to the “January 25 Revolution.”1 Accounts of the 
uprising proudly describe how, despite the millions that swarmed city streets, not 
one church was attacked and how Muslims and Copts came together to forge 
a collective political future in a manner not seen since the 1919 Revolution. 
This show of Christian–Muslim unity during the protests was often contrasted 
with the escalating sectarian tensions that had been front-page news under the 
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Mubarak regime over the previous decade. The Tahrir demonstrations held out 
the hope that perhaps interreligious conflict was a sign of a bygone era, the 
product of a destructive and dehumanizing political order rather than a regular 
feature of Egyptian society. Dramatic eruptions of interreligious violence in post-
Mubarak Egypt have put this hope to rest, the most decisive blow coming on 
October 9, 2011 when more than 30 Copts were killed and over 200 wounded. 
The violence, this time, was not just the handiwork of extremist Muslims; the 
army itself shot at peaceful Coptic protesters, running armed vehicles into the 
crowds gathered not far from Tahrir Square and using the state-run media to 
issue calls to Muslims to “protect” the Egyptian army against the “Christian mob” 
(Hendawi and Michael 2011). This brutal and opportunistic use of force sealed 
the sense among many Copts and Muslims that the interim military government 
is no different than the Mubarak regime in its perpetuation of sectarian violence 
to serve its nefarious ends.
While each sectarian incident has its own morphology, certain systemic factors 
continue to spark tensions now as they did under the Mubarak government. Key 
among these are restrictive laws relating to the building and reconstruction of 
churches, interreligious conversion and marriage, and a broader discriminatory 
ethos against Copts that prevents them from participating equally with Muslims 
in the civic and political life of the country.2
Despite the presence of a robust Coptic elite, few are represented in the army, 
judiciary, and the government, and poor and lower-income Copts are subject 
to discrimination that their Muslim counterparts are spared—all of which has 
solidified the sense among Copts that they are treated as second-class citizens 
in their own country.3 In addition to these systemic factors, the past 15 years 
have also witnessed increasing attacks on Copts and their communal and private 
property that have gone largely unprosecuted by the government. Human-rights 
groups charge that the notorious state security police (State Security Investigation 
Service, SSI) often instigated these attacks in the past, and many suspect that its 
members continue to play a role in fomenting violence, as was evident in the most 
recent attacks by the military government on Coptic protesters. Egyptians fearful 
of the corrosive effects of interreligious strife hold on to the hope that a newly 
elected democratic government will reform the discriminatory laws and establish 
a structure of accountability and prosecution that will not permit perpetrators 
of religiously motivated violence to act with impunity. Others fear that sectarian 
tensions have deeper roots and that governmental reform, although necessary, 
may not be sufficient to address more systemic forces that continue to hijack civic 
and political projects that level (rather than exacerbate) religious differences.
In this brief essay, I focus on one of the key causes of sectarian conflict that 
continues to disrupt the possibility of peaceful coexistence between Copts and 
Muslims: the issue of interreligious marriage and conversion, which has recently 
garnered the attention of the international media as well. It is important to 
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clarify at the outset that the conflict around religious conversion is complex, a 
product of discriminatory state practices that make conversion from Islam to 
Christianity difficult while facilitating conversion from Christianity to Islam. 
Here I touch on the issue of religious conversion insomuch as it pertains to 
interreligious marriages that have been at the root of a series of sectarian clashes 
in post- and prerevolutionary Egypt. As a cursory glance at the last ten years 
of Muslim–Coptic conflict reveals, a vast number of sectarian incidents are set 
off by rumors about an interfaith romance, a woman’s abduction, and marriage. 
This was the case on May 11, 2011, when clashes broke out in the working-class 
neighborhood of Imbaba, leaving 12 people dead and scores injured. Not unlike 
similar incidents in the past, it all started when a Muslim man was rumored to 
have come to Imbaba looking for his wife, whom he claimed had converted to 
Islam the previous year but had suddenly disappeared (Kirkpatrick 2011b). He 
alleged that she had been kidnapped by her Coptic family and was being held 
against her will in the local church, an allegation that local Coptic residents and 
the neighborhood police denied. However, when rumors circulated that a group 
of Salafi Muslims was coming to attack the church, things degenerated quickly 
and an armed battle ensued between groups of Muslims and Copts within clear 
view of the police, who stood by and did nothing to prevent the violence.4 By 
the end of the night, the Muslim crowd had burned and ransacked two churches 
in the neighborhood, leaving the Coptic community irate at the impunity with 
which the attacks were allowed to occur.5
The rumors and allegations that provided the narrative structure for this 
incident exhibit a pattern that is by now familiar to observers of Coptic–Muslim 
strife. A year earlier, in July 2010, similar events had unfolded. A woman by the 
name of Camillia Zakhir, the wife of a Coptic priest, had disappeared from her 
home. Her husband charged that Muslims had abducted her and forced her to 
convert and marry a Muslim man. Copts took to the streets and demanded that 
the state find Zakhir and return her to the Coptic Orthodox Church and her 
family. A few days later, the state security forces did, indeed, locate Zakhir and 
brought her back to her family. The family then handed her over to the Coptic 
Church, which promptly announced that Zakhir had not converted to Islam 
but had left her home because of marital problems (Ramiz and Abdul Sabbur 
2010). Zakhir was sequestered in the Coptic Church until her appearance on 
television almost a year later.6 Subsequently, various Muslim groups started a 
public campaign that accused the church of kidnapping Zakhir in collusion with 
the state, demanding that she be “restored” to the Muslim community. A number 
of attacks were then launched on Coptic churches, and many within the Coptic 
community linked the deadly and unprecedented bomb attack on a prominent 
church in Alexandria (on January 1, 2011) to the protests around the Zakhir 
controversy.7
Six years earlier, an identical story had circulated about a woman named 
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Wafa Qustuntin, also the wife of a Coptic priest. After she went missing, Copts 
charged she had been abducted and forcefully converted to Islam by a Muslim 
colleague at her place of work. Thousands of Coptic Christians took to the streets 
to demand that the state security forces bring her back to the church, and the 
current Coptic patriarch, Shenouda III, used his personal relationship with then 
president Husni Mubarak to pursue this demand. On presidential orders, the state 
security police arrested Qustuntin and handed her over to the church authorities, 
who promptly announced she had not converted to Islam and was holding firm 
in her faith. Qustuntin has not been seen or heard from since and reportedly 
lives in the seclusion of the pope’s monastery in Wadi al-Natroun. These are only 
some of the better- known examples of the form sectarian struggles take in Egypt; 
there are countless others in which interreligious romantic liaisons and women’s 
conversion figure prominently.
Religious and Sexual Difference
These stories seem emblematic of the symbolic weight accorded to women as 
reproducers of a community’s culture and tradition insomuch as women serve as 
placeholders for broader claims about culture, identity, and territoriality. As some 
feminists have observed wryly, women might be the objects of such narratives 
(to be saved or repudiated), but they are seldom its subjects or agents (Mani 
1998). One might recall here the pivotal role played by the figure of the abducted 
woman in a number of myths—such as the Helen of Troy and Ram and Sita 
stories—to think about how gender and sexuality serve as the ground over which 
epic struggles about territoriality and morality have been historically waged. That 
women’s bodies figure prominently in almost all nationalist and communitarian 
struggles (whether ethnic, racial, or religious) in the modern period only serves 
to strengthen this claim.8 Given this pattern, it would seem that these Egyptian 
controversies are yet another example of the anxiety that haunts relations of 
power across lines of sexual and gender differences.
In what follows, I rethink this received wisdom by bringing it into 
conversation with the recent scholarship on secularism, particularly the secular 
state’s regulation of sexual and religious difference. I argue that the gendered 
and sexualized dimensions of interreligious conflict (of the kind I describe 
here) are best understood as a product of the unique paradoxes produced by 
the simultaneous privatization of sexuality and religion under the modern post- 
colonial state. Even though this intertwining of religion and sexuality exhibits a 
normative structure that cuts across the West and non-West divide, in societies 
like Egypt it also takes a particular form in the institutionalization of religion-
based family law (also known as personal status law) in the modern period.9 In 
this model, state-recognized religious communities are granted judicial autonomy 
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over family affairs, often creating a pernicious cathexis between religious identity 
and issues of gender and sexuality. Any attempt to reform family law tends to be 
seen by religious communities (especially religious minorities) as a violation of 
their collective right to religious liberty and of their sovereignty over a domain 
in which they are understood to have jurisdiction.10 As I argue, rather than see 
this resistance as simply an example of religious intransigence and patriarchy, one 
needs to think critically about how modern secular power has transformed the 
concept of “the family,” religious identity, and intracommunal relations, often 
exacerbating earlier patterns of religious hierarchy and gender difference.
Coptic Orthodox Christians, who constitute approximately 10 percent of the 
Egyptian population, have their own family law, distinct from Muslim personal 
status law as well as from that of five other Christian denominations. Coptic 
Orthodox family law currently prohibits divorce and remarriage unless one of the 
spouses has either committed adultery or changed their religion. Because Muslim 
family laws are much more lax in both these respects, Coptic women and men 
sometimes convert to Islam so they can divorce and remarry. That both Wafa 
Qustuntin and Camillia Zakhir were married to Coptic priests with whom they 
reportedly had marital problems led many to argue that the issue was not so much 
conversion as it was Coptic family law itself. Shortly after the Qustuntin incident, 
Karima Kamal, a leading Coptic journalist and the author of a widely acclaimed 
book on the history of Coptic divorce and marriage laws, wrote, “The explosion 
of the crisis of Wafa Qustuntin opened the door to [a public discussion of ] ... the 
relationship of Copts with the state on the one hand and the church on the other. 
But the most important issue [that came to the fore] was the crisis of Coptic 
divorce that has been going on for the past thirty years without any solution” 
(2006:12). Kamal (2006:23, 32) goes on to quote statistics from various parts 
of the country that cite conversion to Islam as the primary reason for divorce 
between Coptic spouses. Notably, Coptic men’s conversion to Islam is subject to 
a different calculus than women’s: Whereas Christian male converts to Islam can 
remain legally married to Christian women, when a Christian female converts 
to Islam, her marriage to a Christian man is immediately annulled according to 
both Muslim and Coptic Christian family laws. Given this combination of laws, 
it is easy to see why many critics of the Coptic Church believe that Coptic women 
who are in difficult marital situations might be tempted to resort to conversion to 
have their marriages automatically annulled by law.
Kamal further points out that, whereas a number of popes in the past 
had permitted Copts to divorce under a variety of circumstances, the current 
pope, Shenouda III, rescinded such permission with the Papal Decree of 18 
November 1971 (reiterated in 1996) deeming divorce and remarriage to be 
a violation of biblical edicts. Kamal argues that Pope Shenouda III’s policy 
de facto encourages Copts to either commit adultery or convert to get out of 
bad marital situations. She makes a plea for the adoption of a state-sponsored 
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1979 bill, crafted in cooperation with other Christian denominations, to create 
a unified Christian family law that makes divorce and remarriage easier for 
Coptic Orthodox Christians (Kamal 2006:18–19, 24). Pope Shenouda III has 
resisted such attempts on the grounds that they violate biblical injunctions and 
constitute an illegitimate intervention into the right of the Coptic community 
to religious freedom guaranteed by the Egyptian constitution. Notably, the pope 
is not alone in perceiving the issue in this manner. A large number of lay Copts 
also see state- sponsored attempts to reform Coptic family law as a violation of 
the religious freedom of the minority community. Ironically, on this position, 
they have an ally in the Muslim Brotherhood—the largest Islamist political 
group in Egypt and long viewed as an antagonist by Copts—on the ground that 
family law represents the core of a religious tradition and must not be tampered 
with (Kirkpatrick 2011a).
Matters are even more complicated when one considers discriminatory 
Egyptian norms and regulations governing religious conversion. When Muslims 
try to convert to Christianity, they face a series of obstacles, key among them, the 
state’s refusal to extend official recognition, making it impossible for the convert to 
procure the legal documents necessary for the conduct of daily civic and political 
life.11 Even though there is no explicit law that prohibits interreligious conversion, 
in practice, the Egyptian state makes conversion from Islam to another religion 
almost impossible while facilitating the reverse. For the first time in 2007, a 
Muslim convert to Christianity brought his case to the Supreme Administrative 
Court to demand that his conversion be recognized by the state and listed on 
his identity card, a request the court denied (Ibrahim 2010). Since then, this 
issue has gained further prominence as Coptic lawyers, with the support of the 
Coptic Church, have brought a case involving a number of former converts to 
Islam who want to reconvert to Christianity (called “al-‘aidin”) to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court, where it is currently pending. Given this combination of 
factors (both internal and external to the Coptic community), it is easy to see 
why Coptic women’s conversion and marriage with Muslims is a constant source 
of anxiety among Copts and has proved to be such an explosive issue in Egypt.
This anxiety manifests itself quite clearly in the belief within the Coptic 
community that there is an organized pan-Islamic plot to abduct Coptic girls and 
coerce them to convert to Islam. Despite the disputed nature of this claim, news 
of Coptic girls’ forced conversion to Islam circulates widely in the national and 
diasporic Coptic media. A recent article in the Egyptian daily al-Masry al-Youm 
reported that “since the toppling of Hosni Mubarak there has been a spike in the 
number of families seeking help over alleged kidnappings [of their daughters]” 
(Beach 2011). The article reports that these claims are highly contestable. Even 
Coptic lawyers who register these complaints often remain skeptical about whether 
Coptic women are being kidnapped, even though they are critical of the broader 
pressure young Coptic women often feel to assimilate to the majoritarian Islamic 
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ethos. Muslim clerics have added fuel to the fire by making a countercharge that 
there is a Coptic plot to abduct Christian women converts to Islam to force them 
back to Christianity.
Over the past five years or so, the U.S. evangelical movement has stepped 
into this volatile context, amplifying the abduction claim and bringing it to 
international attention. In 2009, Christian Solidarity International, an evangelical 
organization that is part of a global network devoted to campaigning against 
the persecution of Christians world- wide, with a particular focus on Muslim 
countries, released a report in partnership with the Coptic Foundation for Human 
Rights. The report does more than seek to “document” an organized Muslim 
conspiracy to abduct Coptic women and to coerce them to convert to Islam 
(Christian Solidarity International and Coptic Foundation for Human Rights 
2009): It elevates the charge of Coptic women’s abduction to “sexual slavery,” 
regarded as a crime by the U.S. State Department (under its Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act) and by the United Nations protocol on human trafficking.12 The 
aim of the report is to pressure the Obama White House and the United Nations 
to investigate and prosecute alleged abductions of Coptic women by Muslims 
in Egypt. The report makes wide use of post–9–11 rhetoric of Islam’s inherent 
violence and misogyny, portraying Coptic women as the vulnerable victims of 
predatory practices of Muslim men that are “rooted in Islamic traditions that 
legitimize violence against women and non-Muslims” (Christian Solidarity 
International and Coptic Foundation for Human Rights 2009:1). Importantly, 
this report (along with the broader campaign of which it is a part) argues that 
the conversion of Coptic women constitutes a violation of the right to religious 
freedom of the Coptic community as a whole. It makes no mention of the Coptic 
Church’s role in the sequestration of women like Zakhir and Qustuntin, casting 
the issue as a matter of the minority group’s right to religious liberty. Notably, 
in this framing, a Coptic woman’s submission to Coptic ecclesiastical authority 
emerges as the paradigmatic act that secures the community’s collective exercise of 
religious liberty—in doing so, it further solidifies the cathexis between religious 
identity and the gendered regulation of sexual and familial relations.
Secularization of Family Law?
The persistence of religion-based family laws in Egypt and the broader Middle 
East is often seen as a sign of the incomplete secularization of these societies 
and the failure of the postcolonial state to draw a firewall separation between 
religion and the state. When contrasted with most Western liberal democracies, 
where family relations are adjudicated by civil courts, the persistence of religion-
based family law appears to be antiquarian and out of date. This state of affairs 
is often understood to be a result partly of the deeply religious ethos of Middle 
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Eastern societies and partly of a colonial policy that abstained from interfering 
in the religious affairs of colonized peoples. Some argue that even as colonial 
powers instituted secular civil and penal laws in the colonies curtailing the scope 
and reach of religion, they left family laws intact as the space par excellence of 
the religious autonomy of native people. Consequently, religion-based family 
laws of societies like Egypt are understood to exhibit an ossified and recalcitrant 
quality that should have been remedied by the secularizing force of civil law. 
The assumption is that if these societies had gone through a complete process of 
secularization, if colonial powers had done their duty, then the religious basis of 
family law would surely have been abolished, taking down with it the patriarchal 
norms of kinship grounded in religious doctrines.
This account is flawed for a number of reasons. To begin with, the telescoping 
of religious law into the domain of the family is not so much a violation of secular 
principles as it is a product of the simultaneous relegation of religion, family, and 
sexuality to the private sphere under the regime of modern governance. As Talal 
Asad has argued, the colonial powers’ enshrinement of religion in family law 
was not so much a sign of their tolerance of local religion as it was a part of “the 
secular formula for privatizing religion” (2003:228) that, in turn, helped secure 
the foundational distinction between the public and the private so central to 
political secularism. The privatization of these aspects of social life did not mean, 
of course, that they fell outside the purview of the state; rather, they came to be 
increasingly regulated by the centralized state and its various political rationalities 
(no longer administered by local muftis, qadis, customary norms, and parochial 
moral knowledges). Family law, under the auspices of the modern state, is there- 
fore not simply a tool for the execution of divine law but one of the techniques of 
modern governance and sexual regulation.
Family law as a distinct legal domain is a modern invention that did not exist 
in its present form in the premodern period. Classical sharia jurisprudence did 
not, for example, entail a separate domain called “family law.” As historians of the 
Middle East show, what is now associated with the core and essence of religion 
(Christian and Muslim alike), that is, personal status or family law, is an amalgam 
constructed from a variety of customary and religious jurisdictions that came to 
acquire an autonomous and distinct character in the modern period (see Cuno 
2009; Tucker 2008). Through a comparative reading of marriage contracts from 
ancient to modern times in Egypt, Amira Sonbol (2005) shows that “the family” 
was neither conceptualized as a social unit responsible for the reproduction of 
the society nor linked to spouses and descendants in the premodern period, as 
it came to be in modern family law. The modern conception of the family—
understood as a legal unit primarily formed through the conjugal bond— stands 
in contrast to the network of kin and affines embedded in a system of rights 
and obligations that constituted what is retrospectively called “the family” in the 
premodern period. Paradoxically, even as the family was assigned to the domain 
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of the private sphere in the 19th century, it also became a key site of intervention 
for projects of social reform undertaken by the state. Thus, in Egypt, as early as 
1931, the family came to be associated with the semantic field of public order 
in the sharia and milli (non-Muslim) courts, and, by 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser 
declared it to be the foundation of the society itself (see Pollard 2005). One 
important effect of this process is the historical transformation wrought in the 
concept of “the family” from a loose network of kin relations and affines to the 
nuclear family, with its attendant notions of conjugality, companionate marriage, 
and bourgeois love.13 As elsewhere in the modern world, the family in the Middle 
East has come to be associated with privacy, affect, spirituality, nurturance, and 
reproduction — ideologically distinct from the individualistic and competitive 
rationality of the public domain and the market.
Insomuch as both Muslim and Coptic family laws are unfair to women (in 
matters of divorce, inheritance, child custody, and so on), they are often assumed 
to be so because of their religious character, engendering the hope that if these laws 
were secularized they would yield greater gender equality. Although there is no 
doubt that in both religious traditions women are regarded as subservient to men, 
gender inequality in family law cannot be understood in religious terms alone. As 
the work of a number of historians shows, once the family became a cornerstone 
for the modernization of society in the Middle East, this often led to greater 
gender inequality, particularly within the institution of marriage. According to 
Judith E. Tucker, for example, in the premodern period, Muslim women had far 
more flexi bility in stipulating conditions in their marriage contracts:
By Mamluk times a variety of stipulations had become commonplace 
such as allowing a wife to opt for divorce should her husband drink 
wine or fail to house and support her children from previous marriage. 
In the Ottoman era, the technique of expanding a bride’s rights through 
contractual stipulation continued apace: a woman might insert clauses 
into her contract that gave her the right of divorce if the husband did 
a number of things, including taking a second wife, changing their 
residence against her will. [2008:62]
Women’s ability to stipulate such conditions almost disappeared in the modern 
period, as “the state stepped up its regulation of marital institution and self-
consciously sought to bring marriage practices of its citizens into sync with its 
vision of modernity” (Tucker 2008:70). In refusing to recognize prenuptial 
conditions added to marriage contracts, Sonbol argues, modern courts effectively 
foreclosed “the most important method by which a [woman] could control her 
marriage” (2005:183) and, by extension, access to divorce. Perhaps the most 
dramatic example of the curtailment of women’s ability to negotiate divorce 
under the modern nation-state was the creation, in 1920, of an unprecedented 
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institution in Egypt called the “house of obedience” (bay al-t’a) that gave the 
state authority to forcibly return a woman to her marital home if she left her 
husband without his consent (Tucker 2008:74). Not surprisingly, the “house of 
obedience” provision was also adopted in Coptic family law because it pertained 
not to the particularity of a religious faith but to the sanctity of the nation that 
all citizens had to uphold.14
The religious basis of Egyptian family law is certainly distinct from its secular 
counterparts in Western liberal societies, but there are paradigmatic features that 
cut across this divide. Religion-based family laws of postcolonial societies share 
a global genealogy that has been recently analyzed by legal theorists Janet Halley 
and Kerry Rittich (2010) in a landmark study on comparative family law. In this 
study, Halley and Rittich argue that modern family law emerged in the 18th 
century for the first time as an autonomous juridical domain distinct from other 
regulatory spheres and came to be adopted globally. They show that modern family 
law, in comparison with other juridical domains, exhibits “exceptional” qualities 
in at least two senses of the term. First, even though it purports to be descriptive, 
family law enfolds normative claims about cohabitation, marriage, sexuality, and 
sexual division of labor that pertain to the domain of obligation, status, and 
affect (in contrast to the domain of rights, will, and rationality). Second, family 
law is exceptional in that it is supposed to emanate from and express “the spirit 
of the people,” their traditions, particularity, and history. In this important sense, 
family law is distinct from contract law, against which it is juxtaposed and which 
is understood as “the real domain” of universality. In the words of Halley and 
Rittich, “It is in the nature of contract law to become the same everywhere and in 
the nature of family law to differ from place to place” (2010:771). Pursuant with 
this logic, while European colonizers imposed their own forms of commercial, 
criminal, and procedural codes in the colonies, the family laws they devised 
were understood to emanate from the religious and customary laws of the native 
peoples. Insomuch as religion was understood to embody the “true spirit” of the 
colonized people (recall the Orientalist construction of “the East” as essentially 
religious and spiritual), it is not surprising that family law came to be grounded 
in the religious traditions of the communities the colonial powers ruled over a 
period of 150 years. Notably, just as family law was invented from fragments of 
various juridical and customary traditions, so was the univocality and unanimity 
of the religious traditions to which the newly formulated family law was supposed 
to correspond. It is therefore not surprising that proponents and defenders of 
Coptic and Muslim family law in Egypt regard it to be consubstantial with the 
defense of the religious tradition itself.
Halley and Ritchie lay out the global genealogy within which religion-based 
family laws are embedded, but it is also important to understand the historical 
particularity of Middle Eastern family law. Importantly, the religion-based family 
laws of Egypt are derived from a larger sociopolitical order from the Ottoman 
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period, in which religious difference was conceptualized and organized in 
a manner distinct from the system of postcolonial nation-states in which it is 
now inserted. As is well known, the Ottoman Empire under the millet system 
accorded various non-Muslim religious communities (known as dhimmis) 
juridical autonomy over aspects of their internal affairs (including marriage but 
other relations as well). This juridical autonomy was one of the primary ways 
in which the Ottomans managed to rule over an immense diversity of religious 
faiths for over six centuries. Importantly, this “nonliberal model of pluralism” 
(Kymlicka 1995:156) was different from the liberal model in that each religious 
community’s autonomy was justified not in terms of group versus individual 
rights but in terms of a political order in which difference was paramount. The 
Ottomans did not aim to politically transform difference into sameness; instead, 
various contiguous religious groups were integrated through a vertical system of 
hierarchy in which Muslims occupied the highest position. Various aspects of this 
older arrangement were slowly transformed over the course of the 19th century, 
and the millet system was replaced with that of the nation-state predicated on 
the principle of civil and political equality—with one key exception, namely, the 
legislative autonomy of religious communities over family affairs. This parsing 
was consistent with the genealogy traced by Halley and Ritchie above in that 
family law was supposed to correspond to and reflect “the true spirit of the peo- 
ple” and their traditions. One significant element of the Ottoman millet system 
that has survived to the detriment of non-Muslim minorities is that Islamic family 
law is upheld as the law of the state to which interdenominational marriages 
of Christians and non-Christians alike are subject.15 Similarly, the interdiction 
against Muslim conversion to Christianity and restrictions imposed against 
the public display of non-Muslim faiths are also fragments from the Ottoman 
system. Needless to say, all of these provisions adversely affect Egyptian religious 
minorities (which include not only Copts but also the increasingly visible Bahais 
and Shiite Muslim minority).
All of these elements may be taken as evidence of Egypt’s incomplete 
secularism insomuch as Islam remains integral to the operation of the state, 
thereby compromising the secular principle of state neutrality toward religion. 
Such an argument ignores much of the recent scholarly literature on secularism, 
which shows that throughout modern history secularism has seldom been 
about state neutrality toward religion.16 Rather, it has historically involved the 
rearticulation of religion along certain lines in all societies (across the West and 
non-West divide) that is modeled on a dominant understanding of religion rooted 
in the majoritarian religious tradition. Secularism in this understanding does not 
simply institute a firewall separation between religion and state but entwines 
them intimately, an intertwining that is shot through with contradictions and 
paradoxes. Taking this insight as a starting point, one might begin to see that one 
of the contradictions entailed in the secularization of Middle Eastern societies 
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is that just as religious authority becomes marginal to the conduct of civic and 
political affairs, it simultaneously comes to acquire a privileged place in the 
regulation of the private sphere (to which the family, religion, and sexuality are 
relegated). In the Middle East, this is, no doubt, in part a result of the insertion 
of a fragment from an older sociopolitical order into the modern system of the 
nation-state. It is also, however, a product of secularism’s foundational divide 
between the public and the private that, on the one hand, relegates religion and 
sexuality (of which family is a part) to the latter and, on the other hand, makes 
both consequential to the former. (This is manifest in the central place accorded to 
“the family” as the social unit responsible for the building of the modern nation-
state and society.) The paradoxical intertwining of religion and sexuality in Egypt 
and in the broader Middle East, then, is neither an expression of the essential 
religiosity of these societies nor a diagnosis of their incomplete secularism. It is 
another mutation of the Janus-faced character of modern secularism, in which 
“religion” is ineluctably tied to its Siamese twin, “the secular,” an intertwining 
that is often disavowed by those who speak in its name.
Concluding Remarks
In summary, I have argued that religion-based family law in modern Egypt 
sutures a fragment from the Ottoman millet system to the political calculus of 
majority–minority national demographics. When inserted in the context of the 
nation-state, this transmuted model of multiple jurisdictions is predicated on a 
fundamental tension intrinsic to the project of modern nationalism: On the one 
hand, this project requires the leveling of difference (enshrined in the principle 
of political and civil equality), and, on the other hand, religion-based family 
law divides the citizenry into separate legal communities, exacerbating their 
differences. To put it in another way, this older fragment of the millet system, 
when placed within the grammar of nationalism and civil and political equality, 
renders difference problematic and recalibrates it to the calculus of majority and 
minority (which, in itself, is conceived as a means for resolving difference). In 
this framework, the attempt by any minority to preserve difference cannot but be 
understood as a threat to national unity. In this sense, at the same time that the 
current crisis of Coptic–Muslim relations no doubt reflects increasing prejudice 
and sectarianism of Egyptian society, it is also a product of the structural tensions 
internal to the postcolonial state and the model of religion–state accommodation 
adopted in the modern period (see Mahmood in press).
The challenges facing post-revolutionary Egypt are manifold, key among them, 
the alleviation of interreligious conflict. The question of secularism looms large, 
and many liberals and radicals are invested in creating a “truly secular” Egypt, one 
in which religious discrimination would be an anomaly and interreligious conflict 
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would wither away. These are worthy goals, without which it is hard to imagine a 
peaceful multireligious society. Yet, in this moment of hope and restructuration, 
it is also imperative to think critically how political secularism—with its modern 
state apparatus and nationalist ideology—is not simply a neutral mechanism in 
the negotiation of religious and sexual difference. Political secularism also aims 
to transform both and, in the process, does not simply level differences but 
exacerbates and realigns them in unique and contradictory ways.
Although there is no doubt that the Mubarak regime and its corrupt policies 
exacerbated Coptic–Muslim tensions, manipulating them to achieve their own 
opportunistic ends (and the current military government seems to be continuing 
the same trend), it would be naive to think that religious sectarian tensions will 
melt away in post-revolutionary Egypt. Many of the reasons for these tensions are 
structural—such as the system of multiple legal jurisdictions (of which family law 
is a part), the Islamic identity of the state, and the nationalist calculus of majority–
minority identities that weighs political and civil equality differently. Any attempt 
to address the sectarian consequences of these political arrangements must not 
only countenance the peculiarity of Egyptian history but also acknowledge that 
secularism is not simply the answer to the problem but also constitutes it. This 
does not mean that one can simply reject secular political forms but requires that 
one reckon with the strengths and weaknesses of these forms in a manner that 
does not resurrect the hoary and polemical religious and secular divide. As to 
whether the Islamist, liberal, or Coptic political parties in Egypt can rise to this 
challenge remains to be seen.
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1. I have worked in Egypt since 1995. My 
first book (Mahmood 2005) analyzes 
women’s participation in the Islamic 
piety movement in Cairo. I am currently 
working on a book project that analyzes 
the politics of religious freedom for 
non-Muslim minorities in postcolonial 
Egypt within the larger context of 
international laws pertaining to 
religious liberty and minority rights. 
On this latter project, see Mahmood 
in press.
2. Evidence of this kind of discrimination 
continues to sour Muslim–Coptic 
relations in post-Mubarak Egypt. For 
example, when a Copt was appointed 
governor of the Qena province by the 
new interim government in April 2011, 
Muslims protested the appointment. As 
Mariz Tadros (2011) reports, although 
the ostensible reason for the protest 
was the candidate’s ties to the Mubarak 
regime, it was clear that his Coptic 
identity was at issue.
3. For a short overview of the 
discrimination faced by Copts in 
postcolonial Egypt, see Soliman 2009.
4. It is unclear whether these attacks 
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were the work of the socalled Salafis—a 
brand of hard-line Islamists who 
have gained prominence in post-
Mubarak Egypt for targeting Sufis, 
Copts, and unveiled women across 
the country. Following the events in 
Imbaba, a number of self-described 
Salafi websites denied that Salafis had 
participated in these events. For an 
eyewitness account by a staff member 
of the main human-rights organization 
that monitors religious strife, see 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 
2011b. For an investigative report 
on May 2011 incidents released by 
the same organization, see Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights 2011a.
5. The state security apparatus and secret 
police have long been accused not only 
of tolerating but also of fomenting 
attacks on Copts. For a report that 
establishes this charge, see Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights 2010.
6. Camillia Zakhir appeared on television 
on May 7, 2011, in the company of her 
husband and son, to state that she 
had not converted to Islam and was 
not being held captive in the church 
but that she had left home because of 
a marital dispute. Some Egyptians have 
interpreted the attack on the Imbaba 
church four days after Zakhir’s public 
statement as a retaliation by Muslim 
extremists to settle the score. See Tadros 
2011 for a discussion of this point.
7. Rumors have surfaced that the state 
security apparatus was involved in the 
bombing of the Alexandria church to 
distract political opposition targeted 
at the government. Files retrieved after 
the Egyptian uprising from the state 
security offices seem to implicate 
Habib el-Adli, the interior minister 
under Mubarak, in the Alexandria 
bombings. See El-Rashidi 2011.
8. In India, for example, stories 
about women’s abduction figured 
prominently during Hindu–Muslim 
clashes in the early 20th century 
leading up to the partition of the 
subcontinent. See Datta 1999.
9. Apart from Egypt, religion-based family 
law is practiced in a variety of countries, 
such as India, Israel, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia. In Lebanon 
alone, there are 15 different family laws 
that pertain to different religious 
confessions.
10. It might be useful here to recall the 
legendary Shahbano controversy in 
India. In 1985, the Supreme Court 
of India ruled that Shahbano, a 
divorced Muslim woman, was to be 
paid alimony by her ex-husband, a 
ruling that was contrary to Muslim 
Family Law but in accord with the 
Criminal Procedure Code of India. The 
Muslim minority of India protested 
this ruling as an unfair incursion by 
the state into affairs over which it had 
legal autonomy, and the government 
decided to exempt Muslim women 
from the requirements of the Criminal 
Procedure Code. For an insightful 
analysis of the sectarian context within 
which this debate unfolded, see Agnes 
2007.
11. It is mandatory for Egyptians to 
declare their religion on national 
identity cards, without which they 
cannot function in society. Copts face 
difficulties not only in having their 
religious conversion documented 
in state records but also in having it 
altered on their identity cards. As a 
result, most converts from Islam to 
Christianity try to get by without 
bothering to attain state recognition.
12. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children 
was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 2000. For an 
insightful analysis of the Christian 
evangelical mobilization that led to 
passage of the UN protocol and of U.S. 
antitrafficking legislation (also in 2000), 
see Bernstein 2007.
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13. Thus, even though male polygamy is 
allowed in Egypt in accord with Islamic 
precepts, it is the nuclear family that 
remains the dominant form. On this 
point, see Abu-Lughod 1998.
14. This institution was abolished in 1967. 
On this issue, see Sonbol 2005 and 
Tucker 2008.
15. Notably, in many Middle Eastern 
countries (such as Syria and Jordan), 
interdenominational marriages across 
Christian sects are subject to the family 
law of one of the two non-Muslim 
spouses. See Berger 2001.
16. I cannot do justice to this literature in 
this short space. For an overview, see Asad 
2003, Asad et al. 2010, Taylor 2007, and 
Warner et al. 2010.
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Intervention:  
Governance or Governmentality?
Reflections on the Palestinian Authority
Rema Hammami
In her 2011 keynote address, Rema Hammami, an 
anthropologist and faculty member at the Institute of Women’s 
Studies, delivered an incisive and thought-provoking analysis of 
“Palestinian Governmentality: Between the Politics of Life and 
Death.” For this issue of the Review, we asked her to contribute 
a brief intervention based on her address. Hammami argues that 
the “current crisis as one of Palestinian governmentality rather 
than simply governance.”
As a technology of governance, development reproduces the underdevelopment it seeks 
to ameliorate.
(Mark Duffield 2005)
What is my priority as a woman? My priority is that Fateh and Hamas end their 
conflict and Israel lifts the blockade. Then I don’t need anything from anyone…
Woman in Gaza who lost her home in 2009 
during Operation Cast Lead, April 2010
 
We will continue to pursue policies that empower women in Palestine and ensure their 
full contribution to the endeavor to build the state. 
Report on the Second Year Program 
of the 13th PNA Government, August 2010
 
Since at least the mid-1990s, political debate in the occupied Palestinian 
territory (oPt) and the Palestinian diaspora has been dominated by the crisis 
of the Palestinian national movement and ultimately, of the national project. 
That almost every sphere of Palestinian political and civic life has at some point 
been a focus of these debates (including; law and human rights; economic and 
social policy; development; negotiation and/or resistance strategies; the role and 
nature of NGOs, political parties, the PLO, and Palestinian Legislative Council) 
suggests the degree to which the crisis has been a totalizing one. Alhough there 
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is little agreement on the specific nature of the crisis or its solution, there is a 
general consensus on its origins: it is rooted in the transformation of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization into the Palestinian National Authority under the 
framework of the 1994 Oslo Accords. This points to another critical but unstated 
consensus – that the foundational dimension of the national crisis is one of 
Palestinian governance as practiced and embodied in the Palestinian Authority. 
The chasm between the opening quotes above is suggestive of this dimension. 
On the one hand, a woman from Gaza, her home destroyed by Israeli bombing, 
represents her reality as defined by Israeli military violence, economic siege, and 
internal political conflict in the national movement. And on the other,in the same 
year, the discourse of the Palestinian Authority asserts a contrasting reality of a 
national government involved in carrying out a project of state building as if the 
Authority is operating in a post or non- conflict environment. There is no overlap 
between the two statements and no shared reality between the woman “citizen” 
and her ostensible government. The quotes also point to another fundamental 
problematic – that of power and agency. The homeless woman under siege 
expresses the limits of her agency by pointing to the configuration of power and 
domination that precludes her from rebuilding her home; the Israeli siege and 
control of Gaza, worsened by the conflict between Hamas and Fateh. In contrast, 
the Palestinian Authority’s statement ignores the constellation of power in which 
it operates and asserts itself as the positive (and sole) agent of change involved in 
empowering women in the process of building the state. 
This ongoing chasm between official discourse and the materiality of everyday 
existence under occupation is my starting point for trying to understand the 
current crisis as one of Palestinian governmentality rather than simply governance. 
The issue is not that the Authority is unresponsive to the needs of the population 
ostensibly under its authority, but that in entering into the Oslo process the 
Palestinian national liberation movement became hostage to the logics and 
practices of post-cold war global governmentality operating in what has been 
called “sovereignty conflicts” (Williams and Pecci 2004, Williams and Heymann 
2004). In the case of Palestine, like Kosovo, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, and a 
host of other situations with unresolved national conflicts, peace agreements have 
been the entry point for the global institutions, practices and logics of “peace-
building” and “state-building”. In all of these cases this has resulted in national 
liberation movements becoming powerfully re-structured into local apparatuses 
of liberal governance, whose correct performance becomes the only basis on which 
they may graduate towards sovereignty (Williams and Pecci 2004, Williams and 
Heymann 2004). As such, in the post-cold war period, sovereignty for state-less 
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nations is no longer an inalienable right as enshrined in international law, but 
has been made a privilege that might be earned through good behavior based 
on the criteria of neo/liberal peace-building (Hooper et. al 2003). But as the 
experience of those other cases has shown, the unfolding logic of the “earned 
sovereignty” framework on the ground tends to produce much more governance 
and governing than it does sovereignty (Chopra 2002, Karadijs 2005). 
Modern governance according to Foucault (who developed the concept of 
governmentality to describe it) is based on biopolitical power (or life-giving 
power) with modern rule accomplished through institutions and practices that 
are aimed at providing for the health and wellbeing of populations (Foucault 
2007, Dean 1999). This conceptualization is relevant when we look at the 
practices of Palestinian Authority governmentality and of global governmentality 
operating through the Authority. Taking care of Palestinian health, education 
and economic wellbeing is the primary undertaking of the Palestinian Authority 
vis a vis the population under its “authority”. In addition, through humanitarian 
and developmental aid the “international community” rules both directly and 
indirectly through biopolitical means over the subject population in the oPt. 
Two major points that emerge from Foucault’s re-conceptualization of modern 
government are: rule over populations takes place through a dispersed range of 
practices and discourses across (and beyond) society, rather than being centered in 
formal political institutions; and that rule accomplished through the techniques 
of healthcare, science, welfare systems, development practice, or civic education 
is much more powerful because it operates not through simple repression but 
through producing subjects who articulate its norms as the normal, the correct, 
the modern or scientific (Foucault 2007, Dean 1999). From this perspective, 
the Palestinian Authority is as much a subject of rule as it is a bearer of it. And 
the effectiveness of global bio-political rule over occupied Palestinians can be 
measured by the degree to which its discourses and practices are reproduced by 
local actors and institutions across a host of social fields and locations in the oPt. 
In the contemporary third world, global governmentality operates on local 
states primarily through the discourse and practices of neo-liberal development 
(Duffield 2005). In contexts of “sovereignty conflicts” like the oPt, neo-liberal 
development becomes part of the discourses of “peace or state-building” but a 
primary focus is put on securitization and good governance (Heathershaw 2008, 
Merlingen, and Ostrauskaite 2005). The promotion of human rights, democracy, 
free markets and rule of law goes hand in hand with a central focus on policing 
and security “reform”. This is because in these contexts, the main priority of 
global governance is to promote an end to armed conflict (or undertake what is 
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called “stabilization”). All other dimensions of development, humanitarianism or 
state building are channeled towards this fundamental goal (Williams and Pecci 
2004, Williams and Heymann 2004).
For Foucault, security forces and policing have an everyday bio-political 
function – to ensure that the techniques of ruling necessary for the wellbeing 
of the population proceed in an orderly way. But they also have a repressive 
function; in defending bio-political rule from fundamental threats to its existence 
(Hanna 2012, Merlingen, and Ostrauskaite 2005). In these circumstances, the 
death or repression of one part of the population is deemed necessary in order 
for the ruling apparatus to continue to provide wellbeing for the majority. These 
repressive functions of modern rule are always accorded a temporary status, as 
a “state of emergency”, or exceptional circumstances that warrant an exception 
to the everyday norm of biopolitics. Thus, the repressive role of the Authority’s 
security forces in putting down Palestinian resistance to “peace” is an integral 
aspect of its attempts to earn benchmarks towards sovereignty within the logics 
of the global biopolitical order that it is hostage to. The violent repression of 
Hamas in the West Bank, by the Palestinian Authority’s security forces becomes 
celebrated as the achievement of law and order (under the tutelage of the United 
States’General Dayton) and a positive benchmark in the Authority’s candidacy 
towards statehood.
But what about sovereignty? In the context of the “Earned Sovereignty” 
framework, Israel is the sovereign state and the Palestinian Authority is the “sub-
state entity” to whom sovereign powers should be incrementally devolved through 
the peace process and under the guidance of the international community. In 
the modern inter-state system, sovereignty is defined as the exclusive jurisdiction 
of a state to exercise political power and authority within its own borders and 
to exercise all rights necessary to preserve its territorial integrity from external 
and internal threats. Foucault, in contrast, rather than looking at the formal 
attributes of modern sovereignty, defined it in relation to the evolution of a 
particular configuration of juridical power; the power over life and death. The 
supreme authority to decide who lived and who died, according to Foucault 
evolved from being the definitive power of the sovereign (monarch or feudal 
lord) in pre-modern autocracies to becoming the definitive power of the state 
in the modern period. As many writers have noted, the sovereign power of 
“independent” nation states at the end of the twentieth century has become 
increasingly unequal within the world system and dominated by what may be 
called “super sovereigns”(Duffield 2005, Mamdani 2009). Within the world 
system the Israeli state is a “super-sovereign.” It is also the sole sovereign in the 
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oPt. And from Foucault’s perspective, its sovereign power is characterized by the 
supreme authority it holds over Palestinian life and death within them (regardless 
of Oslo’s area A, B and C geography). Thus while Palestinian governmentality 
attempts to proceed on the basis of life giving bio-power, it is over-determined 
by the logic of Israeli governmentality towards Palestinians under its sovereign 
rule which is based on the logic of death-making or necropower (Mbembe 
2003). That Israeli rule over Palestinians under its sovereignty in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory has been increasingly necropolitical since Oslo can be seen 
in the massive increase in Palestinian deaths at Israeli hands between the first and 
second intifadas; from 1,000 to more than 7,000. But necropolitics is not simply 
about ruling through murder. Its more constant logic is about the use of power in 
ways that makes the healthy life of populations impossible – active processes that 
undermine health, education,well-being and economy and thus undermine the 
ability of a population to sustain and reproduce itself in a healthy way.
In conclusion, once the Palestinian Liberation Movement entered into the 
Oslo Agreement, it became caught between Israel’s necropolitical rule and the 
global bio-politics of Earned Sovereignty. What this led to was first an epistemic 
restructuring of Palestinian governmentality and then its subsequent implosion 
into competing Palestinian entities in the West Bank and Gaza. Whatever the 
rhetorical promise of “Earned Sovereignty”, its global political rationale is to secure 
what Duffield calls “the sovereign frontier” – to contain conflicts seen as a threat 
to imperial power and its allies rather than to deliver self-determination for state-
less nations. But more than anything, the Janus face of global governmentality 
operating in Palestine can be seen through the ease with which it is able to co-
habit with the ongoing necropolitical logic of Israeli rule over Palestinian lives.
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Gender and Governance: 
Claiming Rights in Post-Colonial Contexts
Aruna Rao
The opening keynote address at the 2011 conference was given 
by Dr. Aruna Rao, co-founder and Executive Director of Gender 
at Work, an international knowledge and capacity building 
work that institution that promotes women’s empowerment and 
gender equality through institutional change. Dr. Rao offered a 
dynamic view of gender and governance issues grounded in her 
understanding that these issues “still bear the legacy of state-society 
relations which were produced under colonial regimes and have 
been further complicated by the dynamics of patriarchy.” Rao 
offered an integrated and sophisticated conceptual framework 
“that connects rights with institutions in a process of social 
change,” and in particular changes relations of power and the 
formal and informal rules that govern power relationships. Her 
rich experience in a range of development organizations – she was 
President of the Association of Women in Development (AWID) 
from 1998-2001— makes her institutional insights particularly 
useful. Below is a slightly shortened version of her paper.
Introduction
This paper examines the notion of ascribed social identity focusing on gender 
relations. It argues that while all societies have accorded different rights and 
opportunities to groups of people on the basis of social identity, colonialism 
exacerbated the status of women. As more universal principles of citizenship and 
human rights are adopted, the paper suggests a model for articulating and achieving 
women’s rights through institutional and organizational change, presenting a 
conceptual model that integrates change processes along dimensions of individual 
and systemic transformation, and of formal as well as informal institutions. This 
represents a dynamic view of governance in a broad sense.
The word “governance” derives from the Greek word meaning to steer and 
from its roots in debates about justice, order and fundamental principles for the 
conduct of human life in ancient city-states to gender and citizenship debates 
in post-colonial contexts today, it has embraced both emancipatory ideals and 
blatant exclusions. The notion of citizenship and the role of the few in deciding 
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for the many in ancient Greece and the application of these principles in feudal 
Europe have been well researched.1 Moreover, research also tells us that the context 
which gave rise to the idea of citizenship based on the rights of the individual 
in Enlightenment Europe varied considerably from the history of citizenship in 
Asian and African countries which were colonized by the European powers. As 
summarized by Kabeer (2002), liberal ideas of citizenship emerged as Europe 
was transforming from feudalism to capitalism, “from a society based on ascribed 
status to one governed by contract relations.”
“These upheavals included the erosion of landed privilege, the spread 
of generalized commodity exchange and an all-embracing process of 
differentiation: between the private sphere of the family and kin and 
the public sphere of state, market and civil society and, within the 
public sphere, between the functioning of the state and the division of 
labour in the economy. Social relations were transformed from quasi-
permanent and involuntary arrangements into ‘voluntary, temporary 
and limited arrangements entered into out of individual self-interests’ 
(Fraser and Gordon 1994: 95)...The acting subject of the newly 
constituted public sphere was the individual whose existence 
preceded social relationships, who entered contracts as a free and 
independent being and who enjoyed rights that were guaranteed 
by law, regardless of social status.”2 (Emphasis mine)
In the colonies however, the story was quite different. The colonial state, according 
to Mamdani, shared a set of fundamental features because “everywhere the 
organization and reorganization of the colonial state was a response to a central 
and overriding question. Briefly put, how can a tiny and foreign minority rule 
over an indigenous majority?”3 For the British colonizers and many others, the 
principle of association or indirect rule through intermediaries was the answer. 
The way this was practiced had profound effects on the societies they ruled. 
Gender and governance issues still bear the legacy of state-society relations which 
were produced under colonial regimes and have been further complicated by the 
dynamics of patriarchy operating through what are termed “ascribed relations” 
meaning communities based on caste, religious community and ethnicity. 
Drawing on available scholarship, this paper will untangle some of these threads 
in an attempt to frame thinking on gender and governance issues in postcolonial 
contexts, distinguishing formal and substantive rights. We will then discuss a 
conceptual framework that connects rights with institutions in a process of social 
change, and examine the gendered nature of formal organizations which mediate 
between policy and practice. 
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Gender and Governance in Postcolonial Contexts
Governance is essentially about decision making by a range of stakeholders 
including those in positions of power and ordinary citizens.4 While governance is 
presumed to be gender neutral, the experience of women all over the world belies 
that assertion. As Ashworth points out,
“In fact, the discourse, procedures, structures and functions of governance 
remain heavily skewed in favour of men in general and certain groups 
of men in particular. This unequal sharing of power leads to an unequal 
sharing of resources - time, incomes, property - between men and 
women. The consequences of this maldistribution are evident in the 
disproportionately high number of women who are illiterate and living 
in extreme poverty.” 5
Mukhopadhyay and others inform us that, “the starting point of feminist critiques 
of the liberal view of citizenship is that it does not accommodate difference”6 
(Mukhopadhyay 2007). The liberal conception treats each person as an individual 
who is entitled to rights regardless of gender, class, race or caste. According to this 
view, ascribed relations have nothing to do with one’s identity and entitlements 
as a citizen. In fact, what feminists have pointed out is that the individual that 
liberalism had in mind was elite, male and white. Thus, while rights standards are 
seemingly neutral, they are in fact deeply gendered. “Thus, entitling all citizens 
to the same rights does not necessarily promote equitable outcomes and formal 
rights do not ensure substantive equality or agency.”7 
Kabeer and Mukhopadhyay point out that this by no means is the whole story 
when it comes to the experience of women in colonized countries in much of 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. In these countries, ascribed relations continue 
to play a dominant role in state-society relations. This happened because colonial 
administrations formalized and codified what were hitherto “heterogeneous and 
fluid social and political arrangements through which relationships within and 
between diverse communities had been managed.”8 This in effect, set up separate 
communities each governed by its own customs and traditions. Using other forms 
of differentiation as well – for example, developing a schedule of caste which 
meant identifying those outside this schedule – which entrenched differences, the 
British in India aimed to ensure that these fairly unstable boundaries precluded 
collective action based on perceived common interests to challenge British rule. 
A key piece of this construction was laws governing private relations in the 
family – what is called personal law or customary law.9 In India for example, this 
entailed selective interpretation of scriptures and religious traditions and turning 
them into ‘law’. In the subcontinent, this won the support of conservative 
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elements in various religious communities to colonial rule. In Africa, as explained 
by Mamdani, it took the form of establishing a dual system of law – one for the 
European colonizers and another for the colonized.
For women in particular, the codification of ‘personal law’ had two important 
implications: 
“First, gender relations and women’s position became emblematic of 
the authentic tradition of particular groups giving meaning to specific 
forms of ethnicity, caste and religious community belongingness. Second, 
the collaboration between indigenous male elites and colonial officers 
in the process of codifying custom and practice resulted in male elite 
interests being codified into law and reducing women to legal minors and 
dependents of men.” 10
In other words, women had no claim to rights as citizens outside the boundaries 
of their ascribed communities. And within those communities, religious laws and 
traditions were discriminatory toward women. So, within the public domain, 
women are not individuals but they are mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters 
– their identity in relation to the state in through their connection with men in 
their family and community. 
This has profound implications for women’s emancipation, rights and 
entitlements. As colonies emerged to become nation states, these boundaries 
persisted. To retain their right to belong to these communities, women must accept 
their subordinate status. If women demand their constitutional rights they will be 
challenging the norms of their community and would face expulsion. 
Not only can rights be accessed only through personal relationships and 
connections, equally important, as Goetz points out, “the problem is not (only) 
that the state does not address gender injustice, but rather, that it cannot. It is 
perceived to have no province nor remit pertaining to the relationship between 
women and men.”11
The effect of poor women’s subordination as citizens is manifest in material 
conditions and in their lack of voice and influence in key decision making 
processes that affect their lives. Among Hindus in India, for example, land has 
traditionally been held jointly by men in a household excluding women totally. 
A change in this law has allowed women to inherit but as some researchers point 
out, women do that to their peril. Speaking of the ‘jat’ kinship system in the 
Punjab, Das Gupta says that “if she should insist on her right to inherit land 
equally under civil law, she would stand a good chance of being murdered.”12 
How can we think about gender justice – or the righting of the injustices 
heaped on women – and rights and how we think about women claiming their 
rights? Women need economic and social rights to secure their livelihoods and 
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they also need to have a say in wider decisions affecting their lives. For that they 
need political and civil rights to influence key decision making processes in a 
range of institutions at different levels ranging from the household to global 
governance institutions. In other words, this speaks to the indivisibility of rights 
in the lives of the poor. 
Gita Sen defined feminist politics as “completing the project of citizenship for 
all” and elaborated four dimensions of substantive equality:13 
•	 Political equality which refers to our interaction as citizens in relation to the state;
•	 Economic equality in relation to property, the labor market, and work;
•	 Norms and Values that are embedded in institutions of society; and
•	 Personal equality which refers to women moving from being viewed and acted on 
as property in the family, home, and relationships 
Thus, if citizenship operates at all these levels, then an absence of citizenship at 
any one level puts citizenship at other levels at risk. So, for example, you cannot 
be making significant progress on voting if you do not also have autonomy and 
agency in the reproductive sphere. Without the latter, you cannot fully engage 
in citizenship.
Gender Justice, Institutions & Social Change
The notion that all citizens have not only political and civic rights but also 
social rights was introduced into the theoretical thinking on citizenship in the 
1950s and opened the door to thinking about addressing social and economic 
inequality and promoting the exercise of political and civil rights by groups 
with little power and resources.14 The idea of “rights” was the basis of liberation 
struggles throughout the global south. The 1990s saw a new focus on governance 
and citizen participation and a new relationship between development and rights. 
In 1986, the United Nations explicitly linked human rights with development 
when it passed the Declaration on the Right to Development. The United Nations 
work on Right to Development is based on 5 core principles: participation, 
accountability, transparency, equity, and non-discrimination (United Nations, 
2004). A ‘rights-based approach’ essentially argues that all people are entitled to 
universal human rights and development should be oriented to meeting those 
rights. Some analysts suggest that a rights perspective politicizes needs and that 
while a needs-based approach identifies the resource requirements of particular 
groups, a rights-based approach provides the means of strengthening people’s 
claims to those resources.15 Most interpretations of ‘rights based frameworks’ by 
human rights organizations and development agencies tend to be either legalistic 
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in nature stressing policy advocacy, the change of laws or formulation of new laws, 
and legal education, or focus on strengthening people’s voice and mobilization 
to demand their rights. Still others use a rights-based framework to shape their 
analysis and design assessments and checklists to guide their programming 
and against which to judge interventions.16 Few however, directly address 
empowerment, the transformation of power relations or the role of institutions – 
both formal and informal – in the complex process of social change.17
However, claiming rights is a political process and it is played out as struggles 
between interests, power and knowledge of differently positioned actors. Social 
change involving distributive justice, equity, and people’s well being too is a 
political struggle. At the heart of both is “transforming inequitable relationships 
and structures of power” and both approaches need to be “grounded in grass-
roots empowerment.”18 In other words, empowerment is the process through 
which people can change the direction of systemic forces that marginalize them 
by building their own capacity to make choices and translate those choices into 
desired outcomes, improving their asset base and transforming the organizational 
and institutional context which govern the use of those assets.19 Empowerment 
is about transforming power relations. Specifically, this means: (i) control over 
resources or assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social); (ii) control 
over ideology (beliefs, values, attitudes); and (iii) changes in the institutions and 
structures that support unequal power relations.20
This perspective is based on human rights agreements but the focus is on an 
understanding of rights as a political process that people forge and define through 
struggle as well as negotiation.21 Because institutions mediate people’s access to 
resources, rights, opportunities, mobility and power, we believe that a focus on 
institutions provides a fruitful meeting point between rights and development 
discourses and action. 
Institutions are rules about how to structure human interactions and social 
relationships so as to make them more predictable, productive, and more 
effective.22 Institutions can respond to peoples’ interests and needs or they can 
repress people’s voices. Some institutions have organizational forms such as state 
bureaucracies, banks, NGOs, and community groups, which are organized by 
formal rules and procedures. Some have more fluid boundaries such as caste 
and kinship systems. They dictate what has value in any given social interaction. 
Many of these rules perpetuate unequal relations of power and are obstacles to 
women’s empowerment and gender equity. Because formal organizations are 
socially embedded, they reflect and reproduce existing power imbalances. So, 
while formal rules may specify non-discrimination in serving a population, 
organizations often operate according to values and rules that may be hidden – 
“rules in use” which marginalize the interests of certain groups such as the poor 
or women. But more than that, “dysfunctional institutions do not just fail to 
deliver services. They disempower – and even silence – the poor through patterns 
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of humiliation, exclusion, and corruption”.23 For poor women, socio-cultural 
institutions such as the household have proved particularly discriminatory sites. 
Below, we posit a conceptual framework that connects rights with institutions 
in a process of social change.24 Central to this process is changing relations of 
power – this means changing formal and informal rules that determine, who 
does what, who gets what, what counts, and who decides. In this framework, 
human rights provide the ethical, normative frame for development processes 
in two directions – from top down as a foundation for policy and institutional 
reform processes and resource decentralization toward greater social and public 
accountability and bottom-up as a foundation for processes of mobilization and 
voice. 
The framework has four main components. From the top are the state and its 
role in providing an opportunity structure. From the bottom is the mobilization 
and empowerment of women to claim their rights. This struggle happens within 
a context—on the right side of the diagram are the organizations crucial to 
mobilization but often less than helpful when it comes to women’s rights. On 
the left side of the diagram are informal institutions – ideology and culture 
maintained by unequal power relations – which once again constrain some action 
and make others possible. An analysis of informal institutions is important for 
strategic reasons (what is possible?) and for reasons of intention (what should 
change?).
Figure 1: Rights, Institutions and Social Change25
REvIEW OF WOMEN STUdIES  ARTICLES  39
Opportunity Structure: To change systems of power, relationships between 
people, institutions and organizations have to shift. From top down this means the 
state must create an opportunity structure, in other words, institutions meaning 
both rules and structures which provide legislative and constitutional guarantees 
of rights, mechanisms of inclusion in social, economic and political life as well as 
processes by which these mechanisms are enacted.26 More specifically, the state 
must provide:
•	 A legislative framework of rights and policies which guarantee freedom 
from violence, equality before the law, inheritance and marriage rights as well 
as other internationally recognized rights. (Specifically, the rights guaranteed 
in the UDHR, CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action)
•	 Mechanisms to ensure access to land, credit, political processes, affordable 
health care (particularly reproductive and maternal health), information, 
education and political processes. The state must also ensure basic food 
security.
•	 Processes by which these policies and mechanisms are implemented. Some 
positive examples include gender budgeting, women’s police stations, and 
training for judges on women’s rights. 
As we move from frameworks to mechanisms to implementation processes the 
difference becomes greater between rhetoric and reality. This is the difference 
between rules and their enactment. For example, if there is legislation against 
violence against women, are there awareness campaigns? Are cases reported 
to police? Are there fair trials, are wrongdoers punished? Similarly if there is 
legislative support for women’s participation in politics, are there fair electoral 
procedures? Are there opportunities for women to challenge gender-biased 
systems? Are elected representatives endowed with real power and resources? If 
there are fair employment practices, do employers comply with the law? Are there 
tribunals that will hear alleged violations? Are there mechanisms of redress?
Empowerment: In fact, states do not lead social change - change depends on 
women’s mobilization and empowerment (the bottom up aspect of the diagram). 
Social change requires that women mobilize, build their resources as movements 
and use these movements to claim their rights. Through mobilizing they 
strengthen their influence over institutions and hold them to account ensuring 
equity. One way of understanding what is required for women to mobilize to 
pursue their interests is that they require five categories of “assets”:27
•	 Aspiration—a belief in the possibility of change and the self-confidence to 
believe that you can contribute to it
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•	 Information—access to various forms of information through various means 
such as mobile phones, TV, radio, newspapers etc.
•	 Organization—membership in effectively led organizations
•	 Financial and material assets such as land, employment
•	 Personal assets—literacy, numeracy and health
However, neither the opportunity structure (top-down) nor mobilization 
and empowerment (bottom-up) happen in a vacuum. Both are influenced by 
contextual factors, chief of which are the existing organizations that conceivably 
will help the realization of rights (civil society organization, political parties and 
trade unions) and the cultural dynamics that exist at both national and local 
levels.
Formal and Informal Institutions: The two sides of the diagram represent the 
context in which the struggle takes place. On the right side of the diagram, we 
show the institutions that are essential to women’s participation—civil society 
organizations, trade unions and political parties. The question is not only do these 
bodies exist but also do they function in ways that will support women’s rights 
and empowerment. There is a growing literature on civil society organizations and 
their effectiveness but our interest is in the less obvious aspects of organizational 
functioning that prevent these organizations from championing women’s rights. 
For example, Goetz and Hassim (2003) have documented how particular aspects 
of political parties support or block women’s participation. Similarly, Rao and 
Kelleher (2002) have described how the “deep structure” of organizations such 
as CSOs can operate to block women’s involvement in the organizations as well 
as prevent the organization from functioning effectively to challenge gendered 
power relations.
The “deep structure” of an organization, like the unconscious of individuals, 
is largely unexamined but constrains some behavior and makes other behavior 
more likely (Rao, Stuart and Kelleher, 1999). For example, one aspect of the 
deep structure is the separation between work and family. As Joan Acker pointed 
out, a key assumption in large organizations is that work is completely separate 
from the rest of life and the organization has first claim on the worker. From this 
follows the idea of the “ideal worker” dedicated to the organization, unhampered 
by familial demands, and …male (Acker, 1990). 
The deep structure is that collection of taken for granted values, ways of 
thinking and working that underlies decision-making and action. Power hides 
the fact that organizations are gendered at very deep levels. More specifically, 
women are prevented from challenging institutions by four inter-related factors: 
•	 Political access: There are neither systems nor powerful actors who can bring 
women’s perspectives and interests to the table;
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•	 Accountability systems: Organizational resources are steered toward 
quantitative targets that are often only distantly related to institutional change 
for gender equality;
•	 Cultural systems: The work-family divide perpetuated by most organizations 
prevents women from being full participants in those organizations as women 
continue to bear the responsibility for child and elderly care; and
•	 Cognitive structures: Work itself is seen mostly within existing, gender-
biased norms and understandings. 
Gender Justice and Institutional Change
Gender at Work posits a conceptual framework that connects rights with 
institutions in a process of social change. There is a growing consensus that to 
make significant impact on gender inequality, we must change institutions. 
By institutions we mean the rules (stated and implicit) that maintain women’s 
unequal position in societies. The terms ‘institution’ and ‘organization’ are often 
used synonymously, but we find it useful to distinguish between the two. We 
understand institutions as the rules for achieving social or economic ends.28 In 
other words, the rules determine who gets what, what counts, who does what, and 
who decides. These rules include values that maintain the gendered division of 
labor, prohibitions on women owning land, restrictions on women’s mobility, and 
perhaps most fundamentally the devaluing of reproductive work. Organizations 
are the social structures created to accomplish particular ends but which embody 
the institutions prevalent in a society. 
Although much has been accomplished toward gender equality, it is still 
true that in no region of the world are women and men equal in legal, social or 
economic rights.29 We believe that this is because the bulk of development and 
human rights work toward gender inequality ignores the role of the institutions 
(formal and informal) that maintain women’s unequal position. One clear 
understanding that has emerged is that institutions change (in large part) as a 
result of the actions of organizations. Whenever an organization intervenes in 
the life of a community it has the on-going choice as to whether to challenge or 
support existing community gender-related norms. 
Gender at Work’s30 work links organizational change, institutional change and 
gender equality. This conception of institutional change is multi-factorial and 
holistic. It is concerned with the individual psychology of women and men, their 
access to resources and the social structures in which they live. From the point of 
view of an organization intervening to change gender-biased institutions, change 
must happen in two places - outside the organization and within. 
The diagram below31 (Figure 2) is an effort to show the changes required 
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outside the organization. The figure is called, What Are We Trying to Change? It 
shows the four interrelated clusters of changes that need to be made. The top two 
clusters are individual (changes in measurable individual conditions -resources, 
voice, freedom from violence, access to health) and individual consciousness 
(knowledge, skills, political consciousness and commitment to change toward 
equality). The bottom two clusters are systemic. The cluster on the right is of 
formal institutional rules as laid down in constitutions, laws and policies. The 
cluster on the left is the informal norms and cultural practices that maintain 
inequality in everyday life. Change in one quadrant is related to change in the 
others. The arrows show possible directions of relationship. 
In order for an organization to act as an agent of change in one or more of the 
clusters it must have certain capabilities and cultural attributes. Among these are 
a particular type of leadership, accountability to women clients, and a capacity 
for dialogue and conflict resolution. The quadrants affect each other in a variety 
of ways. They are: 
•	 Individual/informal: personal skills and consciousness, commitment and 
leadership. 
•	 Individual/formal: resources and opportunities available to staff.
•	 Systemic/formal: organizational policies and procedures, ways of working and 
accountability mechanisms. 
•	 Systemic/Informal: deep structure and organizational culture.
Figure 2: What Are We Trying to Change? 
The function of this framework is not to delineate a fixed process, but rather 
present a way through which to analyze how an intervention promotes change. 
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As the sustainability of change is correlated with an approach that addresses 
change on formal, informal, systemic and individual levels, the framework also 
provides a tool to explore possibilities for directed efforts in other quadrants of 
change. Informal norms or values are often known but are perhaps not stated. 
Changes in these informal norms and values or institutional changes can then 
permeate rules and policies to create new opportunities and sanctions new 
kinds of behaviors. The more formal have to do with tangible changes, be they 
resources, policies or other tangible changes. A lot of the work around women’s 
equality happens in the space of women’s access to resources and opportunities, 
as these are tangible resources. Similarly the formal and more systemic change 
engages legal frameworks, such as CEDAW. 
The same analysis can be applied to the implementing organizations themselves 
– see Figure 3 below, What Are We Trying to Change in Organizations? 
For example, what is the level of women and men’s consciousness within the 
organization? Is there access to resources available to provide on these issues? What 
are the policies in the organization, and are they resourced or staffed? One can also 
then consider the organizational culture, power structures, and the way that the 
beliefs and systems work within the organization. For example, some organizations 
consider themselves to be learning organizations. The values that the organization 
holds shape the efficacy and sustainability of the initiatives it implements. In order 
for an organization to act as an agent of change in one or more of the clusters it 
must have certain capabilities and cultural attributes. Among these are a particular 
type of leadership, accountability to women clients, and a capacity for dialogue and 
conflict resolution. Figure 3 shows changes required within an organization. Similar 
to the earlier framework, the quadrants affect each other in a variety of ways. 
Figure 3: What Are We Trying to Change Within Organizations?
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When changes in these 4 quadrants (above) are not in sync, however, it is difficult 
for organizations or individuals to work together and successfully deliver on 
gender equality. It is crucial to be aware of how these factors interact with each 
other, in order to effect change. Also, it is necessary to strategically identify the 
direction and the nature of the change desired, and to analyze why the change 
is needed at various strategic points. There are numerous potential relationships 
between these different areas of change. Positive change in one dimension does 
not guarantee positive change in another dimension. These dimensions offer 
potential areas for action learning and change for each country context depending 
on the needs in each situation. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined some key threads in the gendered construction of 
identity and agency relevant to governance in postcolonial contexts. Turning then 
to universal principles of human rights, we posited a framework to think about the 
achievement of women’s rights through institutional and organizational change. 
While in the real world seemingly contradictory and competing governance 
priorities and political struggles jostle for preeminence, historical experience 
suggests that women’s substantive rights cannot be disengaged from primary 
political fights. Moreover, addressing internal governance dynamics at levels 
ranging from the household and community to national and global governance 
institutions will contribute to the sustainable realization of rights for the broad 
polity. Though the dynamics of cultural, institutional and organizational change 
are highly contextual, the inter-relationships between the individual and the 
systemic, and the formal and informal, can be explored in local contexts and 
contribute to a conversation about positive change for women’s rights and 
improved governance structures. 
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Casting Out “Citizenship”: 
Israel’s Eviction of Palestinians
Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian
In her presentation at the 2012 conference, Dr. Nadera Shalhoub-
Kevorkian, director of the Gender Studies Program at Mada al 
Carmel (Haifa) and associate professor at the Faculty of Law 
at the Hebrew University, dissected Israeli legal thinking and 
government discourse around the 2003 Citizenship and Entry 
Law which bans Palestinian spouses from the West Bank and Gaza 
from residing with their partners who live in Israel, including 
Jerusalem. Shalhoub-Kevorkian scrutinized both Israel’s “security 
theology” and its underlying demographic agenda. In the light 
of a January 2012 decision of Israel’s High Court upholding the 
constitutionality of this patently racist law, Kevorkian argued 
that the President of the Court, even while offering a dissenting 
opinion, configured the court in favor of the law’s upholding, in 
order not to upset the dominant Israeli consensus, leading to an 
interesting discussion with advocate Hassan Jabarin of Adalah, 
a petitioner in the case, on whether the High Court should be 
a venue for Palestinian legal strategies. For reasons of space, this 
argument is not included here but can be found, along with a rich 
theoretical discussion, in the chapter, “Israel in the Bedroom,” of 
her upcoming book, The Theology of Security, Surveillance and the 
Politics of Fear (forthcoming from Cambridge University Press), 
on which her conference presentation was based. We are grateful 
to Nadera and to Cambridge University Press for permission to 
publish this edited excerpt from her presentation and look forward 
to this important volume. 
In early 2012, Manal, a 29-year-old woman with four children, became a widow 
after ten years of marriage. Her husband, Tayseer, died in his house in the old 
city of Jerusalem, following a battle with cancer. Manal is Tayseer’s distant cousin, 
originally from a village that is a 15 minute drive from the old city of Jerusalem. 
The Israeli institutional logic of keeping Palestinians where they were born, in 
their small villages and neighborhoods, categorized Manal as a West Banker, with 
the right to remain in Jerusalem only if she gets an official permit, even if her 
48  Casting Out “Citizenship”: Israel’s Eviction of Palestinians
husband carried a Jerusalem ID that categorized him as a resident. During the two 
years of Tayseer’s illness, Manal, Tayseer and their children lived on the children’s 
welfare and Tayseer’s disability allowances. The early and painful death of Tayseer 
left Manal in a state of fear, loss and confusion. It turned her not only into a 
single mother without the love and support of the father of her children, but also 
into an illegal entity in her own house. Her status – or lack thereof – restricted 
her mobility and denied her the right to take her daughter to the hospital when 
needed; it also prevented her from financially supporting her family due to the 
cut of her children’s welfare allowances, a cut that was justified by the fact that 
she is a West Banker. After four highly insecure months, Manal decided to look 
for help, and requested the legal aid of a local human right organization to help 
prevent her family from being deported from her home in Jerusalem, The only 
legal way to keep Manal in her home was to apply for a permit, that would allow 
her to stay as a special humanitarian status, an exemption to the general ban on 
spouses with West Bank IDs residing in Israel, including Arab East Jerusalem, 
as mandated by the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, 2003. The fact that 
Manal’s children were born in Jerusalem, and were registered in their father’s ID, 
allowed them to be recognized as permanent residents (not as citizens), gave them 
medical insurance, and access to education in local public schools.
Her request to get an official permit to stay in Jerusalem for humanitarian 
reasons was accepted only 20 months following her application but with several 
conditions The approval letter stated the following:
“The special humanitarian reason is the fact that you had a permit to 
stay when your husband was alive and now following his death you 
remained the only natural guardian of your children. The permit is valid 
as long as the center of your life is in Israel and you are not married to 
a resident of the area/region or as the second wife of a polygamous man. 
When renewing the permit, the center of your life and your personal 
status, will be re-examined. In addition, a security and police oriented 
investigation will be conducted.”
Behind Manal’s immense human suffering lies a well orchestrated legal system 
of population control and surveillance. In Israel, ID cards (including permits) 
were introduced in 1949, following the November 1948 census ( Kassim, 2000). 
Accordingly, all Jews, whether residing in Palestine prior to 1948, or arriving from 
elsewhere, were granted cards. The 165,000 Palestinians that were not expelled 
from what would become Israel were granted ID cards as Tawil-Souri (2010) 
REvIEW OF WOMEN STUdIES  ARTICLES  49
stated: “not so as to incorporate them into Israeli civic and political life per se, but 
so as to prevent the return of the 750,000-plus Palestinian refugees who had been 
expelled or fled, who were then considered “absentees” and thus denied Israeli 
citizenship and any possibility of return.”
Manal and Tayseer’s family were also uprooted in 1948. Manal’s present legal 
and psychosocial condition of living under constant uncertainty raises questions 
of how a state that was built on the uprooting of a group of people– namely the 
Palestinians–uses surveillance strategies and laws to intrude in intimate affairs, such 
as in the case of Manal. How does legislation superimpose on the natural instincts 
inherent in personal ties between kin, by situating communities in a constant fear 
of being exiled and displaced from their own homes and land? How can Manal’s 
bedroom, body-politics, partnership, marital status, change of neighborhood, 
and other related behaviors become “security” threats, or “criminal” acts, that 
permit the state to deport or expel her, as the official temporary approval letter 
indicated? And for what reason would the Israeli Citizenship and Entry Law, have 
the jurisdiction to decide on an individual’s personal status and ability to protect 
their own children?
To answer the previous questions, I will examine Israeli legal discourse and 
government discussions on Israel’s Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, 2003 
(temporary order), approved and amended by the Knesset in March 2007, that 
denies Palestinian citizens and residents of Israel the right to acquire residency 
or citizenship for their family members, primarily spouses from the occupied 
Palestinian territory, but also from “enemy states.” It also bans citizenship for 
“anyone living in an area in which operations that constitute a threat to Israel are 
being carried out” in the opinion of the security services. 
Legalizing Discrimination
On January 11, 2012, in a 6-5 decision, the Supreme Court of Israel in the case of 
MK Zahava Galon v. The Attorney General et al. ruled to reject all appeals against 
the 2003 Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Jabareen & Zaher, 2012). 
According to a January 12, 2012 press release by the Association for Civil Rights 
in Israel, the law, which had originally been passed as a temporary provision but 
has since been renewed each year by the Knesset, prohibits Palestinian spouses 
or children of Israeli citizens from receiving both permanent residency status in 
Israel and Israeli citizenship (ACRI, 2012). The 2003 law permitted Palestinian 
spouses/children of Israeli citizens residing in the West Bank or Gaza who had 
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received temporary residency status in Israel before the enactment of the law to 
continue to renew their temporary status, but it prohibited them from upgrading 
their status to permanent residency or applying for Israeli citizenship. It also 
carried a provision stating that the Israeli government had discretion to strip such 
spouses of temporary status for any perceived national security concern (ACRI, 
2012). A 2007 amendment to the law prohibited Israeli citizens’ Palestinian 
spouses residing in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, or Iraq from applying for any status in 
Israel, either temporary or permanent. Applications for exemption are forbidden 
for males under the age of 35 and females under the age of 25 living in the West 
Bank, and for Gazans of any age.
The civil rights organization Adalah (one of the parties whose appeal to revoke 
the law was rejected by the Supreme Court ruling) argued that the decision, 
which upheld a law that deprived citizens of their right to have families in Israel 
based solely on the nationality or ethnicity of their spouses, constituted clear 
racial discrimination and contradicted the principles of equality enshrined in 
Israel’s Basic Law (AIC, 2012). A law journal article published in 2005, two 
years after the law was originally passed, declared that the law was not only a 
violation of Israel’s Basic Law, but it also constituted a violation of Israel’s duties 
as a state signatory to both the International Covenant on Civil & Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) (Nifkar, 2005). 
A report by the BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and 
Refugee Rights describes in plain terms how the ruling would force members 
of Palestinian families with different residency statuses to make a stark choice: 
live together abroad (putting the Israeli spouse at risk of losing his or her Israeli 
citizenship), live apart from one another, or risk living illegally together in one 
place (Badil, 2012). This report also discusses how targeting Palestinian families 
and forcing them to face such an intolerable choice provides proof of the true, 
race-based “demographic intent” behind the 2003 law: to maintain the Jewish 
racial majority of the state by barring Palestinians from any path to citizenship, 
and, more directly, by providing a legal means by which the government can 
engage in transferring Palestinian temporary residents from Israel. Statements by 
certain members of the Knesset welcoming the Supreme Court ruling provide 
further evidence of this intent. According to MK Otniel Schneller, “the decision 
articulates the rationale of separation between the two peoples and the need to 
maintain a Jewish majority…and character of the State.” In the words of MK 
Yaakov Katz “the state of Israel was saved from being flooded by 2-3 million Arab 
refugees” (Badil, 2012). The stark invocation of a demographic threat also helps 
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to explain the remark of the conservative Supreme Court Justice Asher Grunis, 
who defended his vote for the majority ruling by stating that “human rights 
should not be a prescription for national suicide” (Clyne, 2012).
The Me’uhmashim:  
Between the “Claim of Return” and the Right to Return
Rejecting all appeals against such law situate people like Manal in a constant 
condition of fear and uncertainty, while imposing on her the obligation- if she 
wishes to stay in Jerusalem- to never to marry, change her personal status, and 
make sure not to be defined as someone that is engaged with “police/criminal” 
or “security” related concerns. The question is: How Manal’s family’s safety, unity 
and security can be considered a threat? 
Looking closely at the choice of nomenclature of published Israeli experts’ 
opinions regarding such laws, including those of the leading researcher of Israel’s 
demographic studies, Amnon Soffer, in a study published by the College for 
National Security (Soffer and Shalev 2004), we can identify distinct biases in the 
status of Palestinians based on rhetoric. The study notes:
“the ‘return’ of Palestinians to the sovereign territory of the State of Israel 
[entails] harsh ramifications….the national one is the population of 
Me’uhmashim [this is a militaristic mode of naming, referring to those 
that were granted family re-unifications permits or ID’s] is creating 
a process of “Palestinization” among Arab Israelis that is replacing 
tendencies to “Israelize” such population…..” ( page 7) 
The fact that the researchers are using the word “ return” and are pairing it with 
a military-oriented mode of naming that includes the term, Me’uhmashim, to 
discuss family reunification, points to the fact that the requests of Palestinians 
such as Manal’s, are analyzed as requests for the right to return with its 
“security” dangers. 
Investigating Palestinians who wish to unite with their family members in their 
own land, and portraying them as “security” threats, and “criminal” concerns, is 
reflected by Sofder and Shalev’s (2004) argument that such unification could 
actualize Palestinian’s “Claim to Return”. Note that the researchers used the 
Palestinian’s Right to Return, but then changed it into the “Claim to Return”. 
They explain: (page 7) 
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“the Palestinian’s “return” to the sovereign territory of the State of 
Israel has severe ramifications, in the economic field (huge payments 
for the National insurance allowances for children, unemployment; 
……..); in the security field (on average every fifth attack involved 
an Arab Israeli that got an identity card due to family unification); 
the national field ( the Meu’hmashim population created a process of 
“Palestinization” of Arab Israelis, instead of trends of “Israelization” of 
this population, and this hinders significantly the willingness of Israeli 
Arabs to integrate in the Israeli society); the criminal field (….drug 
offenses, property rights violations……..), and the demographic field 
(and numerical relationships between the Arab and Jewish population, 
pushing the Jewish population from the mixed cities; and strengthening 
the “Arab voice” in the political scene.“
Discussing the issue of “return,” while phrasing it in a manner that destabilizes 
the state’s economic, national and security apparatus, produced Palestinians as 
unwanted others. It also aimed at justifying the construction of new regulatory 
legislations, and discriminatory laws. Furthermore, the politics of naming and 
the use of the word “return”, supports thestate’s colonial logic. This was clear in 
the use of the concept of the “Palestinization” of Arabs in Israel and the act of 
pointing out to the “criminality” of the “other.” 
Surveillance, Security and Demography
Discussing the issue of the Palestinian presence in their homeland, must also be 
analyzed through the logic of an offensive state constantly dealing with a social 
divide, in search of a casus belli against its minorities. As portrayed in Soffer 
and Shalev’s message, Israel should control, through its surveillance strategies, 
count and manage Palestinians to make sure they do not resist oppression, they 
do not speak their political views, they do not raise the issue of their identity as 
Palestinians, and they do not produce too many children that might change the 
demographics of the ruling majority. To make sure, Palestinian’s number do not 
increase, Israel should legislate laws, and create additional systems of control. 
When trying to investigate whether similar issues were raised in committees 
dealing with the newly acted law, we learn that internal discussion in the Israeli 
Knesset (parliament) suggested these concerns. For example, on July 14th, 2003; 
(protocol number 47) : 
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Meni Mazouz (Deputy to the Legal Advisor of the State): Everybody 
understands that this is not a simple proposed law...
Isam Makhoul: Why can’t we be satisfied with the existing options 
that enable the government to take its time, to investigate? It looks like 
the real consideration is the demographic consideration. 
Ehud Yatom: It is written here explicitly that the law came because 
there seem to be a growing involvement of Palestinians in the conflict. 
This should be taken into consideration. One can’t ignore such an issue.
Jamal Zahalka: How many people are involved?
Ehud Yatom: We are talking about 140,000 people that settled 
between 1994 to 2002.
Nisan Slomyanski: Security element is made up of two things. 1. 
That there are terrorists and Mehablim1 2. That they are changing the 
demography. The right to return became the basis, the reason behind 
every agreement that exploded,2 that the State of Israel, including the 
Labor party, strongly opposes the right to return. When there is a group, 
that is willingly and consciously, applying the right to return, and that 
is beyond the subject of terrorism, the State, for sure, needs to protect 
itself.” 
On Children, Securitization and the Law
In a recent publication of the Israeli National Council for the Child (NCC), 
it was revealed that children’s statuses were also affected by security-centric 
ideologies and demographically focused interpretations. The statistics published 
by NCC in 2011 revealed that in May 2011, 155,000 children in Israel lived 
without citizenship. The report also explained that there is an increase of over 
24% since 2001. Over three quarter (77.4%) of those children, are from East 
Jerusalem, positioning children in a state of “unauthorized legality” and “official 
unrecognizability.” In the Knesset’s protocol documents, the rhetorical tools put 
into place by the use of the prefix “un-” meant to convey “a lack of” adequately 
connotes the nuances of the problematic of identifying the children of the 
indigenous Palestinian population. During a discussion in the Knesset following 
the decision of the government in May 2002, that ordered the Minister of 
Interior to refrain from allowing couples from the West Bank or Gaza to have a 
legal status, or get a permit to “live in Israel”; Adi Landau from the the Israeli civil 
rights organization, Ha Moked, explained:
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Adi Landau: Since the decision of the government, children who are 
residents of East Jerusalem are not registered in the population council. 
There is no way to arrange their status.
Yuri Stern, Chair (Knesset member): I do not think this issue 
belongs to the legislation at hand.
Adi Landau: According to this legislation, child residents of Jerusalem 
will not be able to receive a status. The legislation refers to citizens and 
people that are residents of the area and that include children.
Yuri Stern: The Jerusalemite children are permanent residents.
Adi Landau: The Jerusalemite children are not automatically 
permanent residents. We represent hundreds of people that are in such 
conditions. Children of a widowed women, that were married to 
someone from the Shtahim3 stay without any official status, and they 
are candidates of deportation.
Nisan Slomyanski (Knesset member): You are talking about those 
that were born in the Shtahim!
The previous quotation shows that despite the efforts of the representative of Ha 
Moked to explain that many children that live in Jerusalem are living without an 
official legal status, the committee members did not heed her claim. Living without 
an official legal status means that children’s mobility, their access to their educational 
institutions, their health and medical conditions, their safety and livelihood are 
jeopardized, due to their illegitimacy by the Israeli administrative standards. The 
committee chair and other Knesset members refused to acknowledge the conditions 
and dismissed the precarious status of children.
Moreover, both the members of the committee and the Ha Moked 
representative used the term Shtahim to refer to the Palestinian area. The use of 
the word shtahim, as being children of people from the Shtahim, or being born 
in the Shtahim, allowed the violation of children’s basic rights, and denied them 
their rights for security, safety and destabilized – to say the least- their future 
status and conditions. 
When looking further into the discussions carried out in the Knesset regarding 
the proposed law; the committee continued to stress the governmental concerns 
and its directing ideology; while generalizing all the population, and refusing to 
acknowledge children’s rights. This was clearly portrayed in the committee’s chair 
Yuri Stern conclusion (p.20): 
REvIEW OF WOMEN STUdIES  ARTICLES  55
“We are in a state of war with the Palestinian people. This legislation is 
an emergency legislation to a state of war. I want the ministry of Justice 
to review what happened in Europe or in the United States when they 
were in an armed conflict with some countries.”
Stern’s concluding remark aimed at clearly stating - children or not children 
- Palestinians are all terrorists, and should not be granted any official status. 
Children’s rights, in such securitized discourse, lose its value or morality while 
immorality of war prevails.
Security: Justification for Ethnic Cleansing?
As the previous quotations reflected, and as Yuri Stern concluded in the Knesset 
committee discussing Citizenship law, the members of the Knesset promoting 
the law masked clear oppressive and discriminatory intents behind language 
that indiscriminately identifies Palestinian residents of the Shtahim (including 
Jerusalem – mainly those parts of Jerusalem that are defined now as Shtahim, the 
West Bank and Gaza) married to Israeli citizens as terrorists and national security 
threats (Al-Haq, et al., 2012). As an article in the newspaper Haaretz reports, 
the justification of “national security” was much in evidence when the Knesset, 
less than one month after the Supreme Court’s rejection of all appeals to revoke 
it, voted to extend the temporary for another year (with the expectation that it 
would be replaced by new, more permanent legislation sometime in the future). 
The preamble to the extended law quotes an assessment by the Shin Bet that 
Palestinians seeking family unification pose a “heightened security risk,” and that, 
despite the decline in West Bank-originated terrorist attacks, “past experience…
points to use of this population to carry out terror attacks in light of their access 
to targets in Israel.” (Zarchin, 2012). The reliance on the specter of terrorism 
(despite being divorced from the reality of the decline in actual terror attacks) 
is a perfect example of Agamben’s theory of the risk incurred by state “security 
reasoning”: “A state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is 
a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic” 
(Agamben, 2005). Agamben’s analyses is imperative, for it supports my claim that 
there is a new religion, new theology. The new theologists – and here I refer to the 
security generals and the Shabak people – leave no space for any questioning, and 
transform the analyses, to “home” it only in a house and language constructed 
by the persecution of the “other,” the Palestinian, and sustain it with a securitized 
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logic of protecting Jews, without taking into consideration the rights of others, 
including those of Palestinian children.
Citizenship and Entry Law in Palestinian Bedrooms
“We are originally from Yaffa, in 1948, my family was displaced 
and ended up in Jordan. In the 1950’s my uncle, cousins and many 
family members decided to stay in Jerusalem. I was born in Jordan, 
but married my cousin’s neighbor who met me in Amman during my 
cousin’s visit, and proposed to marry me. I now live in Jerusalem…my 
close family never visited me...I live in an area filled with soldiers that 
are harassing us to protect the settlers...I live in Jerusalem like a thief, 
in my land like a criminal, always afraid…walk fast….look around...
never relaxed... I need to renew my permit every year in order to stay 
in my own house with my family,…every year again and again…. 
and the last three years I did not get an official renewal, they kept on 
sending me back, asking for new documents, new papers, checking if I 
am still married to my husband, if I have a Tick (a “criminal file” in 
Hebrew...since 2000...since I got married...I live under so much fear 
and anxiety...last week, I was sleeping with my husband in bed….I was 
in an intimate condition with my husband, when we both saw a small 
red light, moving from one side to the other, from the cupboard to the 
wall, on the bedroom curtains and back…then it disappeared...then…
we both noticed it again...we both froze...froze totally, and my husband 
said with such a low voice, in voice filled with pain, …Maysun, they 
came to take you...Hay usset tasreehek (This is the story of your permit)” 
Maysun, 30 years old.
“I live alone in my house, in Ras el Amud (a small village/neighborhood 
in Jerusalem); my husband is from el Khader, a village in Bethlehem 
area...something like 20-30 minute drive from my house here...of course 
without military checkpoints. I call myself a temporary widow, for I 
have a husband, but, he is prevented from reaching Jerusalem, and the 
children, and my family, and the children’s schools, doctors, grandparents 
and my own work are all in Jerusalem. I am a nurse, certified nurse, 
living with my 4 children alone, and my youngest son misses his father a 
lot….I also miss him…. His father can’t help me when they fight, when 
they are sick. He can’t help them in their home work, nor can he spend 
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time with me and be there for me. When he comes, when he sneaks in, we 
need to be quiet...we can sleep with each other, but like thieves ...we are 
both like this “law”…what do they call it? The absent-present law. We try 
to be absent when present...and want to be present…when they want to 
count us out.” Nariman, 37 years old
In the dominant media representation, there is a clear investment of many 
individuals inside and outside Israel, to portray Israel as a “liberal-democratic state” 
a term whose meaning can vary almost indefinitely. It necessary to understand the 
meaning of such terminology as reflected in the voices and life experiences of the 
Palestinian indigenous population, and particularly in the voices of women such 
as Maysun and Nariman. These women’s voices and narratives, discuss the way 
Israel, as demonstrated by its structural oppressions, and legalized (formal and 
informal) control and surveillance system, became a center for the articulation 
of gender and race politics. Although, these particularities are not all new, the 
second Intifada and the manifestations of hegemonic analyses on “terrorism”, 
mainly following 9/11, revealed new dynamic relations among the Jewish state, 
race and gender. The role of race (in this context, as referring to Palestinians) and 
gender is now being used as a regulatory apparatuses, a mode of surveillance and 
control of the Jewish state.Our examination of Israeli legal discourse allows us 
to comprehend the way the subject of the Palestinian people emerges as a public 
policy issue, and the institutional regulatory and disciplinary responses to which 
turns them, as Maysun and Nariman explained, into criminals and outsiders. 
Nariman’s and Maysun’s life in Jerusalem, although seemingly unrelated to the 
functions of state power, can not be separately analyzed from the context of 
state’s power Their voices reveal that n the Israeli discourse of “security” risks, and 
“demographic” threats, as racial and gendered categories created by disciplinary 
power, racialized and radicalized the law. 
I argue that such racial formation resonates with the Israeli legal culture 
and system, through its “citizenship” law and practices. Nariman and Maysun’s 
recognizability as “approved” subjects of discriminatory public policies is produced 
through their affiliation as Palestinians, created by racialized and gendered 
historical hierarchies invading the boundaries of the Palestinian bedroom. The 
relationship between the forms of Israeli government management and the 
nature of the Jewishness of the state, and its effect on Palestinian’s right to family 
life, home, and spouse’s privacy; is a contentious topic. Achille Mbembe uses 
Agamben’s notion of “necropolitics” and argues that “necropower” (the economy 
of life and death) produces what he calls “death worlds” (Mbembe, 2003, pp.11-
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40). Surveillance and control over Palestinian’s live, family and bedroom, produces 
the disciplinary, biopolitical and necropolitical power of the Jewish state. Out 
casting Palestinians is possible not only simply through Israel’s sovereign right to 
expel, but also through the right to preserve individuals in a state of uncertainty, 
waiting in an eternal waiting room as in a Kafka-style labyrinth of administrative 
processes. The “colonial order of things” as Stoler puts it, and as portrayed in the 
voices shared, can not be dissociated from the sexual and racial politics of the 
Israeli rule, and the formation of the Jewish-democratic state/self (Stoler, 1995, 
p.46). The self-making of the Jewish state, through the conceptualization and 
legalization of government practices, are central to understanding “Israel in the 
Palestinian bedroom”.
Endnotes
1 This means “terrorist,” in Hebrew. 
2 He was referring to the fact that after much 
effort, the agreements did not work out. 
3 Palestinian areas
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Women’s Rights Activism  
in post-January 25 Egypt:
Combating the Shadow of the  
First Lady Syndrome in the Arab World
Hoda Elsadda
In an important intervention, Hoda Elsadda, a founder of 
the Women and Memory Forum in Cairo and a professor at 
both Manchester and Cairo universities, examines the backlash 
against women’s rights activism, and in particular Mubarak-
era reforms of Personal Status Law, following the January 2011 
popular uprising. Elsadda argues “that one of the key obstacles 
that women’s rights activists will face in the months and years 
to come is a prevalent public perception that associates women’s 
rights activists and their activities with the ex-First Lady, 
Suzanne Mubarak, and her entourage—that is, with corrupt 
regime politics in collusion with imperialist agendas.” She 
argues convincingly that this perception runs contrary to the rich 
history of women’s activism in Egypt, although she acknowledges 
the complications of state-sponsored women’s bodies in recent 
years. Elsadda’s article was first published in Middle East Law 
and Governance (Volume 3, 2011) and we thank her and 
the journal for permission to publish in the Review. Elsadda’s 
thoughtful analysis addresses many of the central issues discussed 
by video link at the 2012 conference in a roundtable with Hala 
Kamal on Egypt and Nabila Hamza on Tunisia.
On March 8, 2011, Egyptian women took to the streets to celebrate International 
Women’s Day, in response to a call that was sent out on Facebook for a million-
person women’s march. Since January 25, 2011, Egypt had witnessed a momentous 
transformation in protest culture and power, wherein millions of people took to 
the streets to demand their political rights. Million-person marches demonstrated 
people’s power in the face of a ruthless police state, and eventually succeeded 
in ousting President Husni Mubarak and ending his 30-year dictatorship. On 
this day, the 8th of March, the call brought to the streets a few hundred women, 
nothing near ten thousand, let alone a million. This was not unexpected, as it 
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would have been extremely unrealistic to imagine that the first sparks of a popular 
revolution would bring about overnight a radical transformation in cultural 
attitudes towards women’s rights demands. 
What did come as a surprise and a real shock to all, however, was the marked 
hostility and violence that was unleashed against women protesters, as they were 
harassed and shouted at by groups of men who gathered around them. They were 
accused of following western agendas, and of going against cultural values. These 
accusations are not new, and hark back to some entrenched perceptions that have 
roots in the colonial period when feminist activism was associated with western 
interventionist policies in the region. More significantly, they were insulted for 
being “the followers of Suzanne”, Mubarak’s wife, or in other words, accomplices of 
the decadent and corrupt Mubarak regime that the revolution forced out of power. 
The events of the day were a blow to women activists and supporters of 
women’s rights, particularly after the sense of euphoria and empowerment they 
experienced in Tahrir square—where women worked side by side with men, 
where sexual harassment was non-existent, and where their gender identity was 
superseded by their identity as citizens with equal rights and responsibilities.1 
Women activists struggled to pinpoint the reasons behind the marked 
hostility they witnessed. Many explanations presented themselves: that the call 
was premature and politically naïve (i.e., that the time was not right to prioritize 
women’s issues at this particular moment of political transformation); that the 
organizers of the call did not do a good job mobilizing for the day; that the attacks 
on women protesters were orchestrated by counter-revolutionary forces with the 
intention of forcing women out of the streets and destroying the revolutionary 
spirit; and that it was naïve to imagine that the revolutionary spirit would eradicate 
misogyny and cultural bias against women over night. The answer is probably all 
of the above. In addition, I will argue that one of the key obstacles that women’s 
rights activists will face in the months and years to come is a prevalent public 
perception that associates women’s rights activists and their activities with the ex-
First Lady, Suzanne Mubarak, and her entourage—that is, with corrupt regime 
politics in collusion with imperialist agendas. Already, this public perception is 
being politically manipulated to rescind laws and legislative procedures that were 
passed in the last ten years to improve the legal position of women, particularly 
within Personal Status Laws (PSL). These laws are deliberately being discredited 
as “Suzanne’s laws”, or more pejoratively as “qawanin al-hanim” (hanim meaning 
madam or mistress in Turkish, was used with the definitive article al or “the” to 
refer to Mubarak’s wife by her entourage and the ruling elite). 
The key questions that arise are these: Were these laws politically motivated by 
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a corrupt agenda of a corrupt regime, or did they arise out of the agenda and years 
of work of women’s rights activists? Can they rightly be described as “Suzanne’s 
Laws”? And if the answer is in the negative, what are the reasons that led to this 
conflation between the aspirations and work of rights activists, on the one hand, 
and the political agenda of an authoritarian regime on the other? In what follows, 
I will describe recent campaigns against “Suzanne’s Laws”. I will then shed light 
on the collusion between state policies and women’s rights issues in an attempt 
to elucidate the reasons behind the association of women’s rights with the ex-
First Lady and the ruling regime. Lastly, I will give a short historical narrative 
of the process that led to the legislative changes in order to bring to the fore the 
complexities of legal reform in the context of undemocratic governance, and the 
challenges faced by activists therein. 
On April 19, 2011, Muntasir al-Zayyat—an Islamist lawyer and columnist—
published an article in the popular independent newspaper, al-Masri al-Yawm, 
entitled qawanin al-hanim (a sequel followed a week later). He begins by 
emphasizing the fact that with the fall of Mubarak, we still have to deal with 
the negative consequences of his corrupt regime. He points out that the first five 
years of Mubarak’s presidency seemed to be going in the right direction, taking 
action to relieve the tensions that followed Sadat’s assassination. However, his 
reform policies were soon aborted as he fell under the influence of three men, 
Safwat al-Sharif, Zakariya Azmi and Kamal al-Shazli—senior members of the 
ruling National Democratic Party, and arguably the three most powerful and 
hated men in Egypt—who were soon joined by his wife Suzanne, known as 
al-hanim. Al-Zayyat credits Mubarak’s transformation into a tyrant to his new 
entourage, which isolated him and broke off all channels of communication that 
he had attempted to open with various political groups in Egypt. 
Having situated the ex-First Lady right at the centre of the corrupting 
courtiers, he switches to his main point: namely, the role she played in destroying 
the values of the Egyptian family, according to his point of view, and particularly 
her role in endorsing the issuing of Law No. 1 of 2000, which resulted in 
modifications and procedural changes to the PSL in Egypt. He wonders why it is 
the habit of al-hawanim (plural of hanim, and with reference to both Mubarak’s 
and Sadat’s wives) to disrupt the “stability of the Muslim family” by going against 
religious consensus. His contention primarily revolves around three legislative 
modifications that have been introduced since 2000: the first concerns a law that 
regulates divorce; the second concerns guardianship of children and visitation 
rights of the party who is not the guardian; and the third concerns ‘urfi marriage 
(unregistered marriage). According to al-Zayyat, all of these modifications are 
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anti-religion and contrary to Muslim family values. 
It is noteworthy that the post-25th January campaign against laws passed 
since 2000 was not exclusive to Islamists, though religious arguments were at 
its centre. The liberal Wafd newspaper published a report on Monday March 
28, 2011, condemning the destructive impact of al-hanim on the family in her 
capacity as the head of the National Council for Women (NCW), which pushed 
the laws through parliament. The Wafd reporter pointed out that the NCW was 
established by presidential decree number 90 in 2000, with the ex-First lady 
as president. Hence, the NCW became the “spoilt child” of state institutions. 
The article lists all the laws that were passed or modified since 2000 (i.e., the 
divorce law, the citizenship law, and the guardianship law), as well as the quota 
for women that gave women 64 seats in parliament, as evidence of her political 
manipulation that was destructive on both the private sphere of the family and 
the public sphere of politics. Sameh Ashour— prominent Nasserist and ex-head 
of the lawyers syndicate—is quoted in the article in support of its thesis, and says 
that all the laws that were passed with the backing of Suzanne Mubarak were 
politically motivated to serve the interests of the ruling elite, especially as regards 
the succession plans for Gamal, the son of Mubarak. He stresses that the 64 seats 
for women in parliament were directly in the service of these plans, as all the 
appointees were loyal to the NDP.2 
Women, Nation and Modernity
The centrality of women’s rights issues in political and ideological struggles in 
Egypt goes back to the early stages of nation-building in the nineteenth century, 
when women became icons of the imagined national community and subsequent 
proof of Egypt’s modernity. In 1899, Qasim Amin published a seminal text on 
the history of Egypt, Tahrir al-Mar’a (The Liberation of Women), wherein he 
put forward the argument that the backward status of women was a key reason 
and indicator of the backwardness of the country, and that the improvement of 
the status of women (i.e., making them more modern similar to their western 
sisters) was a prerequisite for the modernization and progress of the country. The 
link between women and the backwardness or progress of the country was in 
the first instance a colonial argument, which propagated the idea that women in 
colonized countries were victims of their societies, and stood as proof that these 
societies were incapable of creating a system of fair self-governance. This, in turn, 
provided a pseudo-legitimacy to the continuation of colonial domination. 
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Many of the early reformers in Arab countries, as they struggled to gain 
independence, were influenced by these arguments and adopted the underlying 
logic—namely, the view that the modernity of the country was proportionate 
or commensurate with the modernity of its women. Modernity was defined 
to mean many things: access to modern education; relinquishing traditional 
customs that were perceived as irrational; an embrace of a way of life that was 
largely modeled on western values and culture; the reformation of religion; and 
last but not least, the liberation of women, symbolically performed in the act of 
unveiling. Women’s bodies became the arena for the struggle over the character 
and image of the nation, leading to the well-known ideological battles over the 
veiling and unveiling of women.3 In the 1920s and 30s, these battles were fought 
between two camps, aptly described as the muhajjabun (proponents of veiling) 
and the sufuriyyun (proponents of unveiling). The first claimed that they were 
protecting cultural authenticity and Muslim family values, while the second 
advocated reform of obsolete traditions. Both fought over the cultural identity of 
the nation as projected via the bodies of women. 
Reforming Personal Status:  
Women’s Activism and State Feminism
Throughout the twentieth century, women remained on the frontline of the 
modernist conflict between tradition and modernity. In 1956, following the success 
of the 1952 revolution of the Free Officers, the new ruling order responded to the 
demands of women activists campaigning for rights and inclusion in the political 
sphere. Women were granted economic and political rights, and were encouraged 
to become active participants in the new welfare state. However, although gaining 
equal rights in the public sphere, women remained subservient to male authority 
in the private sphere, as the PSL that regulated their position within the family 
were left intact. This incongruousness created a bizarre anomaly: while women 
accessed top government positions and secured their economic independence, 
they remained under the control of male family members in such matters as the 
legal guardianship of children, mobility, and access to divorce. In one famous 
incident, a woman minister who was traveling on official business was denied exit 
at the airport because her husband secured an injunction to stop her from leaving 
the country, a right he had as the legal head of the family. 
Efforts to improve the position of women in the private sphere and modify 
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PSL in Egypt have been a defining hallmark of women’s rights activism, from 
the early twentieth century until the present day. Early feminists, such as 
Malak Hifni Nasif (1886-1918) and Hoda Sha‘rawi (1879-1947) spoke up 
against legal discrimination against women. However, a radical shift in women 
activists’ engagement with politics took place in 1956, as the new modern state 
consolidated its power. At the same time that women were granted political and 
economic rights, the Egyptian Feminist Union—an activist forum founded in 
1923 by Hoda Sha‘rawi— was dissolved, and law 384 was issued, establishing 
government control over all civil society institutions. 
Independent women’s organizations and societies were replaced by state-run 
organizations that monopolized all political activism and minimized the role of 
independent civil society. The Egyptian Feminist Union was transformed from a 
political entity into a service-oriented charity, operating under the supervision of 
the Ministry for Social Affairs, and regulated by Law 32/1964. In effect, the state 
nationalized civil society, as it moved towards a one-party system of governance. 
Women continued to lobby for rights that were aligned with existing state 
policies and under the auspices of the ruling party. In 1963, for example, Hikmat 
Abu Zayd—Minister of Social Affairs under Nasser—organized a conference to 
discuss the conditions of women in the labour market, women’s integration in the 
labour market being one of the objectives of Nasser’s political project. 
In the 1970s, as more and more women consolidated their status in public, the 
stark discrepancy between women’s rights in the public and private spheres led to 
several initiatives to modify PSL. This bizarre anomaly was brilliantly captured and 
dramatized in a landmark film, Urid halan (I want a solution), released in 1974. 
Based on a true story, the film exposed the legal injustices codified in the PSL 
that discriminate against women and render them easy victims of unscrupulous 
spouses. The film was a resounding success, and foregrounded the issue of women’s 
subordinate legal status as a social priority on the national agenda. 
The 70s witnessed a number of initiatives to modify the PSL. Local initiatives 
coincided with international mobilization for women’s rights issues across the 
globe, marked by the first international women’s conference in Mexico in 1975 
under the auspices of the UN. The first was led by Aisha Ratib, Professor of Law 
at Cairo University, and Minister of Social Affairs (1971-1977), and the second 
by the Family Planning Association in Cairo, headed by Aziza Husayn, prominent 
activist for women’s rights. Both proposals were drafted by committees of experts, 
but did not find their way to parliament as both were subjected to ferocious 
campaigns claiming to protect authentic family values from destruction. 
In 1979, Law 44 was passed drawing on some of the proposals submitted 
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earlier. It stipulated that husbands must confirm their social status upon 
contracting another marriage. The first wife would then have the right to ask 
for divorce within a year of her being informed of this second marriage, without 
having to prove harm. The law also gave the wife the right to continue living in 
the family home upon divorce, so long as she had custody of her children, hence 
solving (albeit temporarily) a major social problem caused by discriminatory 
family laws as well as a housing problem. In 1984, Law 44 of 1979 was declared 
unconstitutional on procedural grounds, as indeed it was passed by presidential 
decree during the summer recess of parliament, was not of an urgent nature, 
and hence did not qualify as a matter that warranted recourse to the president’s 
exceptional authority. 
In 1985, Law 100 was passed with compromises. To name only one, unlike 
Law 44 which granted women the right to divorce without having to prove 
harm if the husband took another wife, Law 100 required the wife to prove that 
this second marriage caused her harm. Women activists were critical of these 
compromises and setbacks, but were equally critical of the abuse of executive 
authority and the flaunting of due process in passing legislative reform in 1979. 
The 1979 Law has been marked in popular memory as “Jihan’s Law”, referring 
to Sadat’s wife, a reminder of the political manipulation exercised by the residing 
First Lady. It became clear that the legal battle could no longer be confined 
within the circles of experts, but had to be fought on the ground, supported by 
an awareness-raising campaign for women’s rights issues in society. 
The 1980s witnessed the establishment of a new generation of women’s 
organizations: the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association (1982); The Association 
for the Development and Enhancement of Women (1987); The Alliance of Arab 
Women (1987); and the New Woman (1991). In 1988, a group of advocates 
for women’s rights published a short booklet entitled al-Huquq al-qanuniyya li 
al-mar’a al-misriyya bayna al-nadhariyya wa al-tatbiq (Legal rights of Egyptian 
women in theory and practice). This booklet outlined the legal rights of 
women guaranteed under the PSL, as well as a number of recommendations 
for improvement, including a proposal for a new marriage contract that would 
allow a woman to stipulate conditions in her contract regulating her relationship 
with her husband, and facilitating litigation should a dispute arise. The marriage 
contract proposal did not entail a change of the PSL, and was only a procedural 
matter (i.e., a new certificate to be issued by the Ministry of Justice with a list 
of possible conditions that a woman may choose to insert). The conditions were 
not compulsory, and were left as a subject for negotiation between the couple 
entering into marriage. Conditions varied and included, for example, the right 
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of a woman to a judicial no-fault divorce known as khul‘, and the right to travel 
without obtaining permission from the husband. From the outset, the proposal 
was conceptualized as a consciousness-raising tool, inviting men and women to 
consider their rights within marriage, and foregrounding women’s rights issues 
as a matter for public debate. The proposal was met with negative publicity, 
however, and was put on hold. 
In 1993, and in preparation for the NGO forum scheduled to take place in 
concert with the 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 
in Cairo, the government appointed Aziza Husayn as head of the National 
Preparatory Committee for NGOs.4 Ms. Husayn seized this opportunity to 
mobilize women’s rights groups and activists to work collectively and lobby for 
women’s rights. The marriage contract proposal was revived and adopted by the 
Gender and Equality Committee. Legal, social, historical and economic studies 
were commissioned, and a media campaign was launched. The committee 
positioned itself within a liberal Islamic frame of reference, and presented evidence 
from Islamic history to support the idea that women can include conditions 
in their marriage contracts to guarantee their rights. The marriage contract of 
Sukayna bint al-Husayn—great grand-daughter of the prophet Muhammad and 
grand-daughter of Ali ibn Abi Talib—which stated that her husband could not 
take a second wife and could not bar her participating in literary gatherings, was 
cited as an example in Islamic history. Khul‘ was also argued for with reference 
to precedent at the time of the prophet.5 The rationale of situating the project 
within an Islamic frame of reference was to counter arguments that positioned 
women’s rights activism as insensitive to cultural and religious traditions, and/or 
as representative of western-directed agendas.
The advent of the ICPD and the international focus on Egypt also led to the 
revival of the National Commission for Women in 1993, and the beginnings 
of Suzanne Mubarak’s interest in women’s issues. The Commission adopted the 
project for procedural changes in PSL, including the new marriage contract 
and the introduction of the khul‘. In 2000, Law No. 1 was passed: it sought 
to rectify a backlog of cases by reforming procedures; granted women the right 
to khul‘ provided they forfeit their financial rights; facilitated access to court in 
the case of ‘urfi marriages; and introduced the new marriage contract, with a 
list of conditions in an appendix. Further legal modifications followed in 2004 
and 2005, introducing a new family court system, establishing a fund to ensure 
fair and prompt access to alimony and child maintenance, and giving women 
custody of their children until the age of 15. However, the point to remember 
here is that Law No. 1 of 2000 passed through parliament amidst resounding 
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opposition, and only because members of the ruling National Democratic Party 
towed the party line as they were instructed to agree. Despite the consciousness-
raising campaign enthusiastically embraced by women activists, and despite the 
work that was put into conceptualizing and formulating projects for legal reform, 
the outcome was still determined by the endorsement of the First Lady as she 
exercised her political leverage and power.6
Fighting the First Lady Syndrome
Debates on women’s rights continue to be caught up in conflicts over 
representational power struggles involving cultural identity, the role of religion 
in the modern period, and the image of the modern state. Under Mubarak’s rule, 
as he sought to present himself as the sole guardian of the commitment of Egypt 
to modern values in the battle against the rising power of Islamists in the Arab 
region, the role of the ex-First Lady as the foremost champion of women’s rights 
was foregrounded and celebrated. Gradually, what many activists feared when the 
National Council for Women was established came true: the NCW competed 
with existing women’s organizations, sought to appropriate women’s activism and 
work, and tried to monopolize speaking on behalf of all Egyptian women. NCW 
members were disproportionately represented in local, regional and international 
media and forums. Women’s rights activism became linked with the projects of 
the First Lady in popular memory. 
I have attempted to show how the majority of these projects were predominantly 
the work of activists, not necessarily supportive of state policies in general, and 
not necessarily tied to the interests of the ruling elite. Moreover, although the 
sum total of the legislative changes that have been passed since 2000 sought to 
redress serious flaws in PSL that led to immense social problems on the ground, 
they do not, by any stretch of the imagination, satisfy the demands of women’s 
rights activists for an equitable and just PSL. However, as women’s rights issues 
continue to be conflated with the political project of a corrupt and discredited 
regime, activists must brace themselves for a long a protracted fight.
REvIEW OF WOMEN STUdIES  ARTICLES  69
Endnotes
1 On March 3, 2011, a renowned historian 
published an article in which she 
maintained that the post-revolution period 
will witness a new feminism, “a feminism 
embedded in revolution... that to use 
the term ‘feminism’ seems redundant 
or superfluous, even anachronistic.” See 
Margot Badran, “Uprising in Egypt: 
Egypt’s revolution and the new feminism,” 
The Imminent Frame: Secularism, religion, 
and the public sphere, 3 March 2011, 
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/03/03/
egypts-revolution-and-the-new-feminism/ 
(accessed 15 June 2011). However, the 
euphoria expressed in this article was 
soon to prove premature wishful thinking 
after March 8, 2011, and the subsequent 
events.
2 (Report by Mahamoud Abd al-Rahman, 
“qawanin al-hanim... faqidat al-shar‘iyya” 
in al-Wafd, Monday 28 march 2011 
3 Unveiling in the early decades of the 
twentieth century initially meant the 
unveiling of the face. Gradually, it has 
come to mean not wearing a headscarf.
4 The studies conducted as part of the 
National Preparatory Committee of 
NGOs’ work were published in a special 
issue of Hajar. Hoda Elsadda and Salwa 
Bakr, eds, Hajar: Kitab al-Mar’a (Hajar: 
On Women’s Issues) 3-4 (1996), published 
in Cairo by Dar Nusus li al-Nashr.
5 For a detailed account of the marriage 
contract project, see Mona Zulficar and 
Hoda Elsadda, “About the Project to 
Modify the Marriage Contract Certificate” 
Hajar: Kitab al-Mar’a [in Arabic] 3-4 
(1996): 251-70. It is worth pointing out 
that the liberal Islamic approach that the 
Committee adopted in framing women’s 
rights was controversial amongst women 
activists themselves.
6 For an excellent account and analysis of 
the marriage contract campaign, see Diane 
Singerman, “Rewriting Divorce Law in 
Egypt: Reclaiming Islam, Legal Activism, 
and Coalition Politics,” in Remaking 
Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, 
Democratization, ed. Robert W. Hefner 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 161-188.
70 
Fraying at the Edges?
Discordant notes from the margins of India Shining 
Kalyani Menon-Sen
In her keynote address at the 2011 conference, Kalyani Menon-
Sen, an independent researcher and activist based in Delhi, 
asks why violence against “women’s bodies, rights and freedoms” 
has increased in India when the dominant narrative of “India 
Shining” is of relentless economic growth, a flourishing democracy 
and a successful negotiation of modernity and Indian heritage 
and culture. Her rooted analysis argues that a neoliberal state 
in alliance with caste, class and gender hierarchies has produced 
an “upsurge in patriarchy.” She offers a number of detailed 
dissections of “the violence of development” particularly focusing 
on the lethal combination of (Hindu) religious fundamentalism 
and militaristic nationalism in campaigns against the Adavasis, 
a tribal people. She compellingly demonstrates how a resurgence 
in feudal patriarchy and organization has led to killings of 
couples who marry outside caste boundaries, and analyzes the 
contest within the judiciary and with women’s organizations 
combatting these crimes. The rich examples are complemented 
by a overview of the operation of “women and national honor” 
in the construction of “Mother India” and by a call for social 
movements to united “to build alliances to protect and expand 
democratic space.” In so doing and in her incisive link of the 
neoliberal state to anti-democratic hierarchies, Menon-Sen offers 
us a framework for comparison in understanding gender and 
governance in an age of empire. 
The year 2010 drew to a close on a note of hearty good cheer in India, in contrast 
to the gloom and doom in the financial centres of the global North, where a 
cold winter was made colder by the economic recession. “Pitch the question of 
sustained global recovery to a group of experts and cacophony ensues. But talk of 
India’s ride on the road to recovery, and the yeah’s ring loud. This is the big Indian 
story for 2010” crowed The Economic Times1. The optimism continued into 
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2011 with the government’s annual Economic Survey confirming the impressive 
rate of GDP growth in 2009-10. “Whichever way you look — consumers, 
innovation, spending, globalisation — India is at the centre” said Citigroup CEO 
Vikram Pandit, while Mukesh Ambani of Reliance Industries, recently crowned 
as one of the richest men in the world, predicted that India would be a $5-trillion 
economy by 20222. 
Around the same time, another official report confirming another set of 
impressive growth figures was released. The annual report of the National Crime 
Records Bureau (NCRB) showed an increase in crimes against women (from 7.9 
percent in 2005 to 8.2 percent in 2009)3. Rape had the highest growth rate among 
violent crimes, going up from 2487 in 1971 to 21,397 in 2009. More than 27 
percent of total crimes against women were reported from the national capital, 
Delhi, which accounted for 24 percent of rapes, 40 percent of kidnappings and 
abductions, 15 percent of dowry murders and 14 percent of molestation cases. 
Delhi also topped the list in terms of crimes against children. 
The report generated the predictable outrage among women’s groups and 
human rights activists, and the equally predictable defensive responses from 
the police. The Police Commissioner expressed the view that the increase in the 
crime rate was negligible in relation to the increase in population during the same 
period4. He also stated that since, in the majority of cases, the attacker was known 
to the victim or was a member of the victim’s family, the police could do little to 
prevent rapes. 
What the Police Commissioner did not mention was that the NCRB figures 
reflect only part of the picture. These numbers reflect only the cases that are 
registered with the police, which many women’s groups maintain are less than 
half of total crimes against women. Moreover, they include only those offences 
that fall within the definition of “crime against women” - other crimes such as 
murder, assault, custodial violence, witch hunting, honour killings, sex-selective 
abortions and many others are left out of the reckoning. 
A recent study found that that nearly one in four Indian men have committed 
an act of sexual violence at least once in their life and one in five have forced their 
wife or partner to have sex. More than two thirds of the Indian men surveyed for 
the study said that women should tolerate domestic violence for the sake of the 
family, and felt that domestic violence was sometimes justified5. 
These statistics do not match the idea of India that has been successfully 
marketed both globally and nationally – a democracy committed to the ideals of 
non-violence, peace and respect for diversity; a nation that remains connected to 
its glorious past while negotiating progress and modernity with unique grace; a 
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vibrant economy where the energy of growth is breaking traditional barriers of 
caste and community. 
The creation of this vision of India Shining is the result of a conscious project 
of collaboration and alliance-building between the neoliberal state and the power-
holders within traditional caste, class and gender hierarchies from whom the state 
derives support and validation. The increasing deployment and justification of 
the use of violence as a tool of economic, political and social control is the most 
visible manifestation of this alliance. It is not surprising that women are the primary 
targets of violence, given that women’s bodies and women’s lives are the sites where 
hegemonic notions of “development”, “growth” and “progress” are both constructed 
and contested by a range of movements and actors.
The violence of ‘development’
During the last few decades, violence has become embedded in the discourse 
and practice of development in India. The emergence of a political consensus 
(that now includes the Left) in favour of neo-liberal macro-economic ‘reform’ has 
increased the vulnerability of women from already marginalised groups, including 
Dalits6, Adivasis7, landless and migrant workers, informal sector workers and 
the urban poor. An estimated 60 million people have been displaced in the last 
decade by development projects of dubious value, often implemented in the 
face of resistance from communities8. In particular, communities that depend 
on natural resources for their livelihoods are threatened by the provisions of the 
National Environment Policy (2006), passed despite strenuous opposition from 
civil society, which provides justification for prioritising economic considerations 
above environmental sustainability9. 
Changes in the policy framework to allow commercial exploitation of natural 
resources, particularly metals and minerals, have led to large-scale handover 
of forest land to corporations, including multinationals. These areas are the 
traditional homes of Adivasi communities, which are now being subjected to 
a new wave of internal colonialism. The ideology of caste, reinforced by the 
civilising mission initiated during the colonial period and continued by the post-
colonial state, provides the moral justification for the dispossession of Adivasis 
from their lands and way of life. 
The most horrific example of the deployment of violence for the furtherance 
of economic interests through the expropriation of the rights of Adivasis is the 
Salwa Judum movement in the state of Chattisgarh in central India. Officially 
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described as a spontaneous uprising of young men from tribal communities, 
Salwa Judum10 is in fact a state-sponsored counter-insurgency campaign started 
in 2005 ostensibly to counter Maoist guerrillas who have established a significant 
presence in large parts of the state. Tribal youth (many of school-going age) have 
been mobilised into vigilante gangs, designated as ‘special police officers’, equipped 
with motorcycles and arms and given a free hand in “cleaning out” villages as part 
of a scorched earth policy designed to starve the Maoists of local support. Over 
300,000 people from over 600 villages have been displaced and forced into camps 
by Salwa Judum. Reports by human rights organisations, citizens’ groups and 
government-appointed committees have documented extensive violence against 
women and girls by Salwa Judum, including gang rape, sexual mutilation, illegal 
confinement and disappearances of women who resisted forced relocation11. 
The collaboration between the ostensibly secular Congress-led government 
at the centre and the BJP, the Hindu right-wing party in power in Chattisgarh 
in supporting and protecting Salwa Judum underscores the political consensus 
around economic policies. The man widely regarded as being the founder of the 
movement is a politician from the Congress Party, long the most dominant in 
Indian politics. The ground-level leadership of the Salwa Judum is dominated 
by traders and forest contractors, traditional exploiters of the Adivasis. Many of 
these “leaders” were also active in efforts to persuade communities to cede their 
lands to the corporations who had been granted mining rights. 
Although Adivasis consider themselves distinct from and separate from 
Hindus, and were traditionally acknowledged as being outside the caste system, 
Hindu right-wing organisations are now recasting them as Hindus. The political 
project of ‘Hindutva’, or Hindu nationhood, rests on the idea of Hindus being 
indigenous to India – a claim that is challenged by the Adivasis self-identification 
(literally, “original inhabitants”). The movement to bring Adivasis, whom they 
term “vanvasis” or forest dwellers, back to the Hindu fold has proceeded at a fast 
pace in the BJP-ruled States. Since the sexual freedom and personal autonomy 
experienced by women in traditional Adivasi societies is a direct challenge to the 
Hindu patriarchal order, a key element in the reconversion is the imposition of 
Hindu norms related to marriage and sexual relations. For instance, the BBC 
recently reported that Adivasi girls who participated in a mass wedding ceremony 
organised by the government in BJP-ruled Madhya Pradesh were forced to 
undergo a virginity test to prove that they fulfilled Hindu norms of chastity. The 
government admitted that 13 girls who were found to be pregnant were excluded 
from the ceremony12. 
Retribution for those who refuse to return to the Hindu fold is also exacted 
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on the bodies of women. The mass rape of Adivasi nuns by a Hindu mob in 2003 
was justified by the Secretary of the VHP (a militant Hindu organisation) as a 
patriotic Hindu reaction to the conversion of Adivasis by Christian missionaries – 
a remark that the Home Minister in the BJP-led government refused to condemn. 
Caste and the resurgence of feudal patriarchy 
Caste is usually described as a fundamental organising principle of society 
in India, but it should be noted that caste as we know it today is a modern 
phenomenon rather than a core civilisational value as often assumed. Dirks 
(2001)13 has unpacked the role of colonial state in the production of caste through 
the bureaucratic effort to categorise and ‘freeze’ the diverse and fluid social 
identities, communities and modes of social organisation that the British Raj 
encountered in India. Caste politics was a significant element in the nationalist 
struggle for independence and caste assertions by leaders like Ambedkar were 
seen as threats to the unity of national purpose. The optimistic assumption that 
caste would disappear with modernity (reflected for instance in the fact that 
the affirmative actions built into the Constitution were time-limited) was not 
fulfilled – instead, caste has crystallised into perhaps the most powerful marker 
of poverty, exclusion, domination and oppression, and is a central focus of social 
movements for equality. 
The rapid economic transformation experienced by some privileged regions 
and communities threatens entrenched hierarchies of class, caste and gender and 
has created the conditions for the revival of casteism in new and more powerful 
forms. The clan councils or khap panchayats in rural North India exemplify this 
phenomenon. These traditional bodies of the landowning Jat community claim 
control over large clusters of Jat-dominated villages, all the inhabitants of which 
are deemed to be siblings even if they are not related by blood. Khaps are said 
to have originated in the 14th century, and are composed of 10-15 male village 
elders, who claim the status of institutions of local self-governance, intervening 
to resolve familial and property disputes. Although the khap is a Jat institution, 
it enjoys the support of all the dominant caste groups, which are willing to sink 
social and political differences in the interests of solidarity against assertions by 
Dalits and other new claimants to political space. 
The power and influence of the khaps has suffered considerable attrition in 
recent years, partly because of their supersession by elected panchayats under the 
three-tier system of local governance introduced through the 73rd Amendment to 
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the Constitution in 1992. Perhaps more significantly, traditional khap strongholds 
like Haryana and Punjab have seen rapid urbanisation and economic growth, 
creating sharp social and economic contradictions. For instance, Haryana has the 
highest per capita income in the country, but the lowest child sex ratio (821 girls 
to 1000 boys in the 0-6 age group). Sex determination followed by sex-selective 
abortion is widely practised. The tradition of women marrying into families of a 
higher social class has resulted in a surplus of brides at the top of the social order 
and a pronounced deficit at the bottom of the social order14. 
At the same time, urbanisation, access to education and exposure to a wider 
world through the media has generated new aspirations in young women who 
are increasingly reluctant to confine themselves to the traditional female domains 
of kitchens and cattle-sheds. Given the diminishing pool of marriageable girls in 
the community, these assertions of independence have generated a high level of 
anxiety within families and have led to the tightening of patriarchal controls on 
women’s sexuality. The perceived need to control daughters has revalidated the 
traditional khap function of ensuring caste endogamy and clan exogamy. 
Marrying outside caste boundaries
The issue became public in June 2010, when a women’s group petitioned the 
Supreme Court of India to intervene and protect young couples who had married 
outside caste boundaries or married within the clan. The khaps were pronouncing 
judgements on these supposedly incestuous relationships and imposing 
punishments ranging from heavy fines, social boycotts or permanent exile from 
the village for entire families. In many cases, especially where the relationship 
transgressed caste boundaries or where the couple sought legal recourse, the khaps 
were ordering the concerned families to reclaim their honour by killing their 
offending children. The murders were brutal and were carried out in full public 
view, with the police turning a blind eye and the village community openly 
applauding the killers as heroes who had restored honour to the community. 
According to figures compiled by women’s groups, 900 young people were 
victims of honour killings in a single year in the three northern states of Punjab, 
Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. 
The Supreme Court order blew away the comfortable conviction that honour 
killings were a reflection of a regressive mindset that India and Indians have moved 
away from in the era of spectacular growth and emergence as a “global player” 
on the world stage. The main opposition party, the Hindu rightwing BJP15 that 
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has always taken a sly delight in highlighting and condemning reports of honour 
killings from Pakistan, was forced to issue a statement condemning the khaps, 
while its sister organisations, the RSS and VHP, were vocal in supporting the right 
of communities to defend their “culture and tradition” To the embarrassment of 
the government, the Chief Minister of Haryana, himself a Jat, upheld the right 
of the khaps to maintain the “social order” and described the media furore as an 
over-reaction. Even more shocking was the position taken by a young politician 
from Haryana, a member of the ruling party’s supposedly progressive “youth 
brigade,” who demanded an amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act to expand 
the definition of consanguinity and to give the khaps the status of family courts 
under the law.
Responding to the Supreme Court, the Home Ministry proposed an 
amendment to the law in order to include honour killing as a specific form of 
murder under which families, communities and caste councils could be held 
collectively guilty. However, the cabinet – which includes several members of the 
Jat community – failed to reach a consensus on the proposed amendment, which 
was referred to State governments for their comments and agreement.
The furore reached a crescendo when a woman judge in a lower court in 
Haryana awarded the death penalty to five members of a family who were 
convicted – under existing laws - of the kidnapping and murder of Manoj and 
Babli, a young couple who had been outlawed by the khap because they belonged 
to the same clan and were therefore deemed to be siblings even though they were 
not blood relatives. The couple had approached the court for police protection, 
and were in fact kidnapped from a bus despite being accompanied an armed police 
escort. The head of the khap, on whose orders the murder was carried out (and 
who happened to be the girl’s grandfather) was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
The judgement included a strong condemnation of the khaps, holding them to be 
illegal and unconstitutional16. 
The verdict was hailed by feminists and human rights activists who pointed 
out that it was a lack of political will that allowed the khaps to function, rather 
than any inadequacy in existing laws. On the other hand, the ruling unleashed 
a storm of protest from the khaps, who vowed to get the ruling overturned. 
A hastily organised mahapanchayat – a meeting of khaps across clans – was 
attended by thousands and a huge amount of money was collected to meet the 
legal expenses of the appeal. A decision was also taken to demand formal legal 
status and recognition for the khaps as institutions of local self-governance. The 
mahapanchayat was chaired by a former judge of the Rajasthan High Court who 
now emerged as a champion of Hindu tradition and caste pride. Another eminent 
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participant at the meeting, a former police chief, warned those who opposed the 
khaps and their diktats that they would also face harsh punishments. 
While the media headlined the judgement as a blow against the “killer khaps”, 
public responses on blogs and websites in the aftermath of the verdict repeatedly 
endorsed the notion of community honour as lying in the chastity and virtue of 
its women, which must be preserved by keeping their bodies away from contact 
with “unauthorised” men17. 
This view also finds reflection in the judgement pronounced by the Supreme 
Court while commuting the death sentence in a case where a young Brahmin 
man killed his sister’s husband, a Dalit whom she had married secretly. “It is 
common experience that when the younger sister commits something unusual 
and in this case it was an inter-caste, inter-community marriage out of a secret 
love affair, then in society it is the elder brother who justifiably or otherwise is 
held responsible for not stopping such an affair....if he became the victim of his 
wrong but genuine caste considerations, it would not justify the death sentence. 
The vicious grip of the caste, community, religion, though totally unjustified, is 
a stark reality.”18
Why Male Violence?  
Unemployment and Attacks on “City Girls”
Choudhury (2010)19 sees a clear link between violence against women and the 
high rate of male unemployment in Haryana resulting in forced bachelorhood for 
large numbers of young men whose lack of a job pushes them out of the marriage 
market. This is the group that is most vigilant in policing women’s relationships 
and enforcing the diktats of the khaps. 
The anger and alienation of young men is most visible in the immediate 
hinterland of Delhi, in villages surrounding the satellite cities of Gurgaon and 
NOIDA. These villages are the target of private developers who are taking 
advantage of the Haryana’s government’s pro-urbanisation policies and buying up 
huge tracts of agricultural land for conversion into high-end real estate. Jat families 
with large landholdings, battling the negative fallouts of the Green Revolution 
and diminishing returns in agriculture, have queued up to sell their land. Since 
most land deals involve tax evasion through a component of cash payment, 
farming families suddenly found themselves flush with “black” cash. Young men 
in these families have discarded the Jat tradition of frugality for conspicuous 
consumption – large mansions, flashy cars, branded clothes, imported guns and 
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high-end drugs. Many of these young men turn to crime, apparently out of 
boredom and the need to do something – according to the Gurgaon police, rates 
of violent crimes such as rape, murder, extortion and kidnapping show a sharp 
spike in areas where real-estate developers have moved in20. 
Alienated from their land and from productive work, increasingly distanced 
from their children who no longer respect their authority, the older generation 
is finding itself marginalised and disempowered. While older women sink into 
depression, the men turn to the khaps which they see as a platform that can 
restore their self-respect and sense of control21. 
A significant number of incidents of violence against women in Delhi are 
attributed to young men from the villages surrounding the satellite cities22. 
Communities in these villages justify violence against “city girls” as fitting 
punishment for their immorality. A case that excited a great deal of public debate 
was the gang rape of a young student at a NOIDA business school who was sitting 
with her male friend in a parked car outside a busy mall in the early evening. The 
car was surrounded by a group of ten young men returning from a cricket match, 
who beat up the man with cricket stumps leaving him unconscious. The young 
woman was dragged to a nearby field and raped repeatedly. The assailants were 
arrested within 24 hours of the crime – they were all below 25, college dropouts 
from wealthy Jat families who made no attempt to hide or escape and readily 
admitted to what they had done. The sarpanch expressed surprise at the shock and 
outrage in the media.”They are blowing things out of proportion – she was just 
raped, that’s not such a big deal” he was quoted as saying. Others said that the 
couple were “doing something wrong” and the boys only did their duty by acting 
to stop it. The mother of one of the boys appeared on TV channels to say that the 
girl was at fault. “She must have done something to anger them. Agreed the boys 
made a mistake but it is not that big a crime. The girl is at fault here. These big 
city types come here and corrupt our village” she said. 
Mother India: women and national honour
Under patriarchy, the honour of the community and the honour of the nation 
are both inscribed on the bodies of women. Normally relegated to the margins, at 
times of nationalist struggle women come to symbolize the honour and virtue of 
the nation. They become the icons, the mother-figures for whom men are willing 
to lay down their lives. It is on this notion of womanhood that the cultural 
identity of the community and the nation is built.
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Throughout the freedom movement in India, nationalists portrayed the 
country in feminine terms. India was “the motherland” – depicted as a mother 
goddess in conformity with the rules of Hindu iconography. On 14 August, 
1947, the day before the country was partitioned and became a ‘nation’, the front 
page of a Hindu right-wing weekly, the Organiser, carried a map of India on 
which lay a woman. Her right arm (representing Pakistan) had been severed and 
Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, was shown standing over her with 
a bloody knife in his hand.
In the large-scale violence that was sparked off by the Partition, thousands of 
women were actually raped, abducted, sold into slavery and prostitution, both 
by their own men and by men of the ‘other’ community. When the time came 
for them to `go home’, many had formed new relationships and did not want to 
leave their husbands and children. Social workers trying to “reunite” women with 
their natal families was asked “Who are you to meddle in our lives?” Another 
woman social worker admitted that at times she sympathized with the abducted 
women “as a woman” but felt compelled to “act as an Indian” and force them to 
return. The abducted women themselves were given no choice – once she was 
located, she had to be brought back to her real “nation”23.
The idea of Mother India, the nation as mother goddess, continues to exert a 
powerful influence on the national imagination and is deployed both by the state 
and the Hindu right-wing to good effect in situations of crisis. The nationalism 
being constructed by the Hindu right wing casts women as mothers and wives, 
supporters of men as they struggle for a Hindu rashtra or nation. Feminism is 
explicitly condemned as a western import that subverts women to the service of 
individual desires and goes against traditional values. Ironically, Indian women 
who win crowns in international beauty competitions have been congratulated 
by the BJP, even as the consumerist values and lifestyles they sell are condemned 
as un-Indian. 
In confronting neoliberalism and market capitalism, the Hindu right is faced 
with the same dilemmas as Indian nationalists who struggled against colonialism. 
Both are attracted to modernity and capitalist economic and political structures, 
and are struggling with anxieties about loss of a distinctive Indian identity. 
Chatterjee (1986)24 has shown that which Nationalist Indian men handled this 
anxiety by emphasising the “distinctive spiritual essence” of Indian culture and 
highlighting Indians’ superiority to the colonisers in the “spiritual domain”, 
while simultaneously emphasising the need to acquire the skills, technologies and 
forms of economic and political organisation that enable material domination. 
In struggling to establish themselves as “modern but different”, Indian nationalist 
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men have emphasised a sharp demarcation between the “inner” or spiritual realm 
of the nation (in which nationalists claim superiority to and autonomy from the 
West) and an outer or material realm (in which the subordination of the nation 
to the West is acknowledged). 
The burden of representing the inner realm of the nation in nationalist 
discourse falls largely on the figure of the “modern” Indian woman. The discourse 
of Indian nationalism continues to cast women as the signifiers of an essentialised 
“Indianness.” Oppressive gender relationships within traditional family practices 
such as arranged marriages and joint families are glamorised and sanctified by 
the popular media, and “adjustment” is emphasised as women’s primary virtue. 
Mainstream Indian films and TV continue to cash in on stories depicting utopian 
families, where parents find suitable spouses for their children, brothers lived 
harmoniously together and women happily accept patriarchal controls on their 
sexuality and economic autonomy. 
Nanda (2009)25 has analysed the close links between neo-liberal globalisation 
and Hinduism in India. Middle-class Indians are becoming more actively religious 
as they are becoming more prosperous. The state, ostensibly secular and socialist, 
is complicit in this process, as is the corporate sector. From actively promoting 
religious tourism, to allowing private sector trusts to run the institutions that 
impart ‘value-based’ (read Hindu) education, to giving away land at highly 
subsidised rates to gurus and self proclaimed god-men, the actions and policies of 
the government foster the promotion of Hinduism.
Violence is built into the militant forms of nationalism being promoted 
primarily, but not exclusively, by the Hindu right-wing in India. The conscious 
construction of a macho masculinity during the nationalist movement was 
a response to the British valorisation of Muslim “martial races” and depiction 
of Hindu subjects as effeminate. Violence by the lumpen stormtroopers of the 
Hindu right against Muslims and Christians, most recently in Gujarat and Orissa, 
reflects a conscious effort to demonise these groups. 
 
“Good governance” and women’s rights 
Apart from the trends discussed above, the neo-liberal model of development 
as economic growth is threatening and constraining the political space for the 
achievement of women’s rights and gender equality and is widening the gap 
between policy and practice. This trend is visible in the changing articulation 
of women’s rights in public discourse and public policy in India over the last 
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decade. Many of the key policy documents of the 1990s reflect the contribution 
of activists from women’s movements in policy dialogue and policy formulation 
during this period. As a result, feminist analyses and priorities found their way 
into documents like the National Policy on Education (1988) and the Approach 
Paper of the Ninth Five Year Plan (1995)26. 
In the last decade however, there has been a steady shift towards identifying 
gender equality as a means - an essential precondition for development - rather 
than as a desirable end in itself. While policy documents contain grandiloquent 
rhetoric on “rights-based development,”resource allocations reflect the neo-liberal 
maxim that sees ‘economic empowerment’ as the sole and sufficient requirement 
for gender equality. Policy-makers apparently see no contradiction between the 
promotion of schemes for economic empowerment simultaneously with measures 
such as cuts in social sector spending, the introduction of user fees in health and 
education, the dismantling of the public distribution system, the phasing out of 
agricultural subsidies, deregulation of food markets and elimination of protective 
labour legislation.
Women’s groups are finding it increasingly difficult to challenge patriarchal 
and anti-poor development ideologies through mainstream institutions and 
processes of governance. Strategies such as participation in expert committees and 
groups set up to advise on policy reform, are yielding diminishing returns. The 
adoption by the development community of a diluted and depoliticised version 
of “gender mainstreaming” and the perception of microcredit as a magic bullet 
that can cure both poverty and women’s subordination, has further constrained 
the space for promoting women’s rights. Today, all the major national schemes 
for women’s empowerment are in essence microcredit schemes, although they are 
advertised as “microcredit plus”. 
It would seem that, in their eagerness to promote financially viable and 
minimalist interventions, the government is glossing over the contradictions 
emerging in microfinance programmes, and are making unjustified assumptions 
about their “empowerment outcomes.”27 The Human Rights Commission has 
ordered an enquiry into the recent suicides of several members of women’s 
microcredit groups in Andhra Pradesh, the southern State that has promoted 
thousands of self-help groups and claims that they have brought about rural 
transformation.It has emerged that in many cases, interest on loans is as high as 
40 percent and women are trapped in debt, forced to borrow from one institution 
to pay off the interest on the loan from another. Many clients exist only on paper 
and proxy agents are operating freely in the absence of financial checks and 
balances.28 Some well-known firms such as SKS Microfinance which recently 
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entered the global market with a successful international public offering, have 
been revealed to be indulging in dubious financial practices, in effect using the 
savings of poor women to further their own speculative share market operations. 
While the legal framework for women’s rights is being augmented with new 
laws on the right to information, domestic violence, sexual harassment and 
women’s property rights, implementation mechanisms continue to be constrained 
by patriarchal norms and controlled by powerful caste and class interests that 
actively promote women’s subordination. As described earlier in this paper, judicial 
institutions are not immune to these tendencies - pronouncements and decisions 
by the judiciary on issues such as domestic violence, rape, honour killings and child 
sexual abuse often reinforce and legitimise the patriarchal boundaries that protect 
the sanctity of the private domain. 
Feminist research in diverse sites of contestation of women’s rights over the last 
two decades supports the assertion that the concepts and discourses of citizenship 
are explicitly androcentric and do not reflect women’s experiences, priorities or 
practices. According to Tanika Sarkar (2001)29, women will always be incomplete 
national subjects, because land is central to the territorial concept of the nation and 
women’s right to own and inherit land is still a contested issue. 
Women’s movements in India have focused on action against violence 
as a strategy that can expand the political space for the exercise of democracy 
not only for women, but for all other struggling subordinated and oppressed 
groups. From a feminist perspective, political space can be conceptualised as a 
series of interconnected and expanding domains within which discourses and 
relations of production and reproduction are constructed. Starting with the 
self, political space expands outwards through the sphere of direct interactions 
to larger institutional and structural spheres. Action against violence can create 
opportunities for women to assert their agency and identities as rights-bearers, 
thus expanding the boundaries of political action and reconfiguring relationships 
and discourses in each of these spheres. 
Conclusions
This paper presents evidence from India to support the contention that the joint 
operation of neo-liberal macroeconomic policies, religious fundamentalism and 
militaristic nationalisms has created the conditions for a renewed upsurge of 
patriarchy and has revitalised existing hierarchies of caste and race. The sharp 
increase in violence against women’s bodies, rights and freedoms in the decades 
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after liberalisation, is the most visible face of the collusion between these three 
global forces. 
While the trends described in this paper are global, the case of India is 
important because of its current push for global power status. Out of the four 
BRIC countries that are projected to emerge as global economic powers by the 
middle of this century - Brazil, Russia, India and China - India is most aggressive 
about projecting its civilizational virtues. In this narrative, India with its Hindu 
civilization is presented as the bright, forward-looking side of globalisation, while 
Pakistan - and indeed, Islam itself - is made to stand for its dark, demonic and 
regressive underbelly. 
The challenge for Indian social movements is build alliances to protect and 
expand democratic space in the face of powerful forces that are polarising and 
alienating social movements from each other. There are many struggles on the 
ground, but the lack of a cohesive political platform that can carry the aspirations 
of these struggles into the larger political system undermines their aspirations. 
The feminist focus on violence against women has been criticised as a divisive 
and polarising issue that weakens social movements and makes them vulnerable. 
This paper supports the opposite view – that violence against women is important 
precisely because it can politicise seemingly neutral spaces and discourses by 
exposing their hidden gender, class and caste biases. Action against violence can 
therefore forge solidarity and alliances across these same gender, class and caste 
divides, and brings together movements for survival, against fundamentalism and 
for democracy onto a unified political platform.
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In Search of the Social:
Prisoners and the Poor in an  
Emerging Palestinian Social Contract
Penny Johnson
What does the desperate plea of a Palestinian ex-prisoner to the 
Palestinian Authority and a new structure of Palestinian social 
assistance proposed by the World Bank have in common, Penny 
Johnson asked in her 2011 conference presentation. The link she 
explores is a “re-configuration of the Palestinian social contract” 
in the troubled post-Oslo terrain. After proposing a typology of 
existing Palestinian social contracts, she traces the emergence 
of “the poor” as a category after Oslo, and the movement of 
Palestinian political prisoners to the margins of a unsovereign 
“state.” Penny Johnson is an associate researcher at the Institute 
and the co-editor of the Review of Women’s Studies.
In this presentation, I want to follow the thread of two seemingly unrelated 
recent events – one dramatic and one bureaucratic – and investigate how they 
might connect in what I call “a search for the social.” At stake, I believe, is a 
re-configuration of the Palestinian social contract, that imaginary but powerful 
concept where the population consents to the political order in exchange for the 
state’s protection and services. 
Event 1: On 18 January 2011, a resident of Bethlehem telephoned Ma’an 
radio threatening to set himself on fire in front of the Palestinian Authority’s 
cabinet building. Imprisoned for six years by Israel and his home demolished, he 
also lost a hand in the 2001 Israeli incursion into Bethlehem. Since his release, he 
says, the Palestinian Authority has not responded to his appeals for help. Unlike 
the then on-going Tunisian intifada sparked by a self-immolation, he said he did 
not want to start a revolution, but “felt torching himself was the only way to draw 
attention to the plight of ex-detainees.” (Maan News Agency 18 January 2011). 
How can we understand this man’s situation?
Event 2: A month earlier, on 18 December 2010, the Palestinian Authority 
and the European Union paid a quarterly cash allowance to 56,400 vulnerable 
Palestinian households, for a total of just under 11.5 million Euros. (Relief Web, 
86  In Search of the Social: Prisoners and the Poor in an Emerging Palestinian Social Contract
18 December 2010) Why is this news? Because these payments, launched in 
2010 and termed the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Program (PNCTP), 
are hailed by the World Bank as “one of the PA’s main reform achievements in 
2010,” (Relief Web, 27 September 2010). And the Bank, a main strategist of 
this Program and a persistent advocate of Palestinian social safety net reform, 
clearly aims for this Program to supercede the special hardship categories that 
have governed Palestinian social assistance, both in governmental and UNRWA 
provisions, for as long as most of us can remember. These categories, if you recall, 
were highly gendered – the absence of a male breadwinner was a fundamental 
requirement and the main categories included widows, divorcees, orphans, the 
chronically ill and disabled, the elderly, and, somewhat bemusedly in this age, 
single women. Abandoning these categories, the PNCTP, according to the World 
Bank, has one category: the extreme poor. As we shall see, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs is a partner to this program but has a somewhat different story and vision. 
How can we understand these changes?
I argue here that the “plight of ex-detainees” that propelled a man to contemplate 
suicide and the “rationalization” of the Palestinian social safety net have an odd 
but important affinity. In both instances, Palestinian government – in close but 
unequal partnership with international donors – is moving away from extending 
assistance and support to its citizens (or subjects) on the basis of status categories, 
such as widows, to what appears to be a more universal and fair allocation. In the 
case of general social assistance, this is based on measurable economic need – the 
beneficiary household must be under the extreme poverty line, according to a quite 
complicated survey instrument called the PMDF or Proxy Means Testing Formula 
with 33 variables, called by the Bank “the most advanced cash assistance program 
in the region.” (Relief Web 27 September 2010)
In the case of prisoners, the Authority, through the Ministry of Prisoners Affairs, 
has recently proposed and at least partially implemented a new “salary” scale for 
prisoners in Israeli jails based on numbers of years in prison and allocations for 
children under eighteen. These regulations were presented to the Cabinet in June 
2010, significantly the year of the reform of social assistance as well. While there 
has been a “salary” for prisoners since December 2004, these detailed regulations 
clearly represent an initiative to further standardize and reform assistance to 
prisoners on the basis of a universally applicable scale. Universal allocations or 
“salaries” for both the extreme poor and political prisoners seems to echo a signal 
movement – from status to contract – that is enshrined in Western political 
theory as the basis of democracy (and significantly private property). Does this 
have any relevance to Palestine in its peculiar situation: a government that is more 
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an extended bureaucracy than a state and is certainly not the only contractor to 
its subjects. And if there is an emerging social contract, what is being exchanged 
between our state and citizens-in-the-making? And most significantly, what is 
absent?
Before addressing this question, let us note previous – and still operative- 
models of a social contract in Palestine. These include the contract of dependency 
between UNRWA and Palestinian refugees, the corporatist contract between the 
PLO and its institutions and factions, and, following Carole Pateman’s Australian 
example, what we could call the “settler contract” of Israel where settlers found a 
society on “empty land” and a state of nature.
One, Many or None: Social Contracts in Palestine
The non-sovereign status of the Palestinian National Authority means that a social 
contract has multiple parties, including the international community and local 
non-governmental organizations and one spoiler: the Israeli occupation. And 
there are models of social contracts already operating that need to be taken into 
account. do not have time to examine the oldest and most-established of contract-
like relationships: the contract of dependency between UNRWA and Palestinian 
refugees. The dependency embedded in this relationship has been often criticized 
but is reinforced by serial crisis where UNRWA becomes the main dependable 
source of basic needs – as witnessed by the high trust shown by residents of Gaza 
camps in a 2008 poll, as well as UNRWA’s key role in supporting the Gaza civilian 
population during Israel’s assault. and its aftermath. Most recently, UNRWA, the 
PLO and the Authority received the same rating – 6 out of 10 - Arguably, this 
model of a social contract is powerful enough to influence other forms of “state”-
society relations in Palestine – and the dependency embedded in its relationship 
can be an obstacle to active, rather than passive, citizenship. 
Corporatist Contract
A continuing influential model of a social contract comes from the political culture 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization where political parties, military wings, 
NGOs, trade unions, women and students organizations, research centers and 
commercial enterprises were all part of the proto-state. In this model, as George 
Giacaman has observed, nothing stood outside of the PLO as an autonomous 
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sphere of civil society, essentially conflating political and civil society (Giacaman 
1998, 6). It is both a corporatist model of a social contract and a model dominated 
by the ideal of national liberation where the nation is one. As Hammami and 
Johnson have pointed out, this model is also deeply inflected by “familialism,” 
(Hammami and Johnson 1999, 324), where the nation is conceived as a family. 
While this model is still operating, I would argue that the fissures in the Palestinian 
national project, the appearance of political actors outside the PLO framework, 
deepening social inequalities, new economic and the post-Arafat initiatives of the 
Authority for state building and reform, are acting to produce a new model or 
models of the relation between governance and the governed.
And the social contract itself as Carole Pateman reminds us in her discussion 
of the the social contract in the West, emerged as a “fraternal contract,” a contract 
among males or brothers. An older contract which she names the “sexual contract” 
is a hidden parallel. Pateman in her later work developed a relevant notion of a 
“settler contract.” Indeed, the Israeli occupying power’s approach is quite close 
to the “settler contract” Pateman examined in the Australian case where settlers 
found a society on a presumed “state of nature” or terra nullius (empty land), 
which erases the native population. (Pateman and Mills 2007, 40) We thus have a 
deliberately absent social contract between the occupying power and the occupied 
to add to our models.
From the Margins: Reflections on Prisoners and the Poor
It is the emerging social contract – as well as this absent contract – that concerns 
us the most as we r reflect on the situation of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails 
and their families, as well as that of poor or vulnerable families and individuals, 
as a lens into understanding the current configuration of the Palestinian “social 
contract” If one had imagined a Palestinian social contract in the 1980s, prisoners 
(and martyrs) would perhaps have been at its center – those who had sacrificed 
much for the nation and to whom much was owed. In the two decades afterwards – 
of the Oslo peace process and its companion the past decade of intifada, repression, 
and fragmentation, we can trace a movement of prisoners from the center to “ 
the margins of the state,” to use Veena Das’s useful term even if “state” is also, we 
must admit, also an imaginary construct in the Palestinian colonial present. This 
movement to the margins reflects both the spatial and political contours of this 
colonial present, almost as if Israel’s removal of most of its prisons from the West 
Bank and Gaza (with the important exception of Ofer, created during the second 
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intifada) and the sealing of its borders has made political prisoners invisible. And 
at these margins, what do we see? What do prisoners then tell us about this present 
and the political order and social contract underpinning Palestinian state-building? 
Das argues for a view from the margins precisely in order to understand the “state” 
and its formation:
“An anthropology of the margins offers a unique perspective to the 
understanding of the state, not because it captures exotic practices, but 
because it suggests that such margins are a necessary entailment of the 
state, much as the exception is a necessary component of the rule.” ( Das 
and Poole 2004,4)
In this light, it is also quite interesting to reflect how “the poor” as a category 
emerged on the margins of the Oslo state-building process at its very inception. 
Before Oslo, as Jamil Hilal and I once suggested Palestinian society in the West 
Bank and Gaza rarely deployed the discourse or concept of “the poor” (fu’ara) or 
indeed of poverty – even though poverty and vulnerability clearly marked the 
lives of many Palestinians, In the period of direct Israeli military occupation , the 
dominant PLO discourse addressed the suffering of Palestinians under occupation 
through the lens of injustice, denial of rights and inequality to a whole people. 
The developmental vision embodied in local grassroots movements of the 1980s 
in the West Bank and Gaza tended to address deprived collectivities – such as 
“remote rural communities” or “refugee camps” – without differentiating “the 
poor” from the community as a whole. When such differentiation occurred it 
was usually in the name of “social justice,” rather than “poverty.” Poverty as a 
concept is largely a “post-Oslo subject” (Hilal and Johnson 2003, 60), emerging 
from Palestinian state-building and governance in a highly globalized framework 
where addressing poverty was and is as a critical element of encouraging and 
stabilizing the peace process. Poverty was a subject for expert administration and 
bureaucracy, for poverty lines, poverty policies and poverty experts, rather than 
an issue for the public sphere.
Can we suggest that political prisoners have also become a category to be 
administered rather than a question of justice to be addressed? Certainly, the 
positioning of prisoners since the Oslo agreements has undergone a series of 
shifts, some quite paradoxical. With the coming of the Palestinian Authority 
– marked by a fairly large-scale release of Palestinian prisoners – assistance to 
political prisoners could at last be publicly acknowledged where previously all 
aid to prisoners and prisoners’ families was clandestine. Indeed one of the first 
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actions of the new Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs was to include them as a 
“category” for assistance. The incorporation of ex-prisoners into the new security 
services in the Arafat period of the PA – a policy that became a subject of reform 
in the post-Arafat era and is addressed in a series of regulations – was highly 
visible, if problematic. But the issue of political prisoners nonetheless seemed 
to move inexorably to the margins of the enterprise of Palestinian governance. 
Of special interest, the proposed 2010 regulations are presented as “amending” 
the 2004 Law on Prisoners and Liberated Prisoners. That law did not include a 
scale of assistance but notably contained at least two promises to prisoners: that 
the PA was committed to their liberation and that the PA would not sign any 
peace agreement without the release of all prisoners. These commitments have 
not been reiterated or addressed in the proposed amendments, although the latter 
was recently were affirmed orally by President Mahmoud Abbas.
The incorporation of prisoners as subjects for assistance, whether in the 
Ministry of Social Affairs or the Ministry of Prisoners Affairs currently, seems 
then to be accompanied by the decline of political prisoners as political subjects 
and actors, Let us look back at our the “event” that opened our presentation. 
Perhaps the Bethlehem man who after all did not set himself on fire could be 
considered a non-event. We also do not know if he really received no assistance at 
all or simply not the assistance he needed. But a better starting point in to consider 
his desperation. Again, we could attribute it to him alone – except in focus groups 
begun this January with prisoners’ families and ex-prisoners by Birzeit’s Institute 
of Community and Public Health in cooperation with the Institute of Women’s 
Studies, we hear the same desperation and isolation, albeit at a lower register. 
I should stress that this project is in its initial exploratory stage and here I am 
listening to the voices, rather than presenting findings.
Even though almost all of the families, most with long-term prisoners, received 
some form of the “salary” from the Ministry – if not in the amounts cited in the 
new scale – the common refrain to the question “who helps?”” was that there is 
“no one who helps.” How can we explain this absent universal? “It’s not just the 
money,” said one prisoner’s mother in Jenin refugee camp, “no one even asks us 
a question.” A widow in the same discussion, whose oldest son is a long-term 
prisoner, added “No one helps. No one. No institution. No shekel, nothing. In 
the world, no one asks about us.” These remarks, echoed time and time again in 
the discussions, alert us not only to the material needs of families – which we 
will discuss further – but to the need for social concern and public action , to be 
brought out of the margins and into the center of Palestinian sociality and public 
life. That is where, many of the families say, prisoners were situated in the 1980s 
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and the first intifada – but now, prisoners have lost their “value,” a subject the 
collective project will be exploring in more depth as the research continues.
And the problems most often cited by prisoners and their families – the 
immense difficulties and constraints of prison visits – are problems of a different 
order that literally occur not just on the margins but outside the Palestinian state 
in the making.
Almost the only form of support acknowledged by these families then is the 
“salary” from the Ministry – I should add here that there is a more irregular 
PLO payment that comes through factions in the PLO, a reminder that the 
corporatist social contract still operates. Thus, an important question is what 
forms of social support a the “salary” for prisoners replacing? The language of a 
“salary” for prisoners might implicitly recognize that such a “salary” is in exchange 
for the prisoners work or contribution to the nation, but more explicitly places 
the prisoner as a bureaucratic employment of the government. 
And salaries are assumed to be for the support of the prisoner, rather than the 
prisoners’ families. Practically speaking, this is at least partly the case – one of the 
main complaints of prisoners families are the high costs of items in the Israeli 
prison canteen so much so that they say “all the money goes to Israel.” And even 
though the new scale allows for “equality between male and female prisoners” , 
there is a gendered dimension as most political prisoners are males and it is the 
mothers and wives of prisoners who must make do with the remaining portion 
of their prisoners “salary” for family survival. And the fact that there is a salary 
works against the generation of other forms of social support. In a particularly 
outspoken session with prisoners wives and mothers from Kalandia camp, 
Ramllah/Bireh and surrounding villages,one wife complained:
The children need money but everyone says “well you have the 
allowance, organize yourself (dabri halek). 
Another woman even added that she had been insulted by remarks like “Well 
I wish my husband was in prison so we would have a salary.” And of course 
the salary is often claimed by more than one party, including the imprisoned 
husband but also the husband’s parents or other relatives. One strong-minded 
wife of a long-term prisoner, who struggle for many years to open a salon in her 
house to have her own income, commented:
As wives of prisoners, you have children to raise by yourself. But 
you have to give to your mother-in-law as well. In front of them you 
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must be strong. And you suffer through the checkpoints and the 
searching and then your husband is angry “you didn’t pay enough 
for the canteen. If you forgot one time his shirt, he forgets your 
twenty years of work.”
A former woman political prisoner in this group tried, with very mixed success, to 
stop the wave of complaints by evoking the sacred status of political prisoners. But 
this evocation can be a hollow formula if wives and mothers are not supported by 
an active public value given to their husbands and sons sacrifice. While the salary 
is not a deliberate negation of this political and social value – and no one would 
deny prisoners and their families regular financial support given to prisoners – it 
nonetheless stands as a bureaucratic exchange that does not actively recognize 
political prisoners as central to the national project.
A New Social Contract?
Let us turn briefly to our second event, the new PNCTP or Palestinian National 
Cash Transfer Program. I would like confess a bias: I came to the subject after 
interviewing the World Bank official in charge of this initiative two years ago 
convinced (and critical) that the World Bank had a model for “ social safety net 
reform” targeting only the ultra-poor that it was determined to implement since 
at least 2004 and despite a few twists and turns, this model would eventually 
be implemented without the ability to change it by its very junior partner, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. I wondered then would it mean for a renewed social 
contract if this initiative is successful and the old “status-based” program is 
replaced by a “poverty-based” program targeting only the ultra-poor? The social 
safety net framework seemed inadequate to address poverty and vulnerability in 
the Palestinian context and the Bank official was clear that a unified system of 
social protection for all Palestinians was “too huge”. Taking away entitlements 
from “status” categories – such as the disabled, elderly and widows – without 
other forms of social protection for these categories, may not only harm their 
welfare, but be seen as negative by the Palestinian public. While it is true that 
the previous system or systems was plagued with fragmentation and inadequate 
provisions and failures to address many forms of poverty, the special hardship 
categories of assistance – also found in zakat committees – represented a social 
consensus of sorts on where society has a duty to provide (such as to widows 
and orphans). These also reflect Islamic charitable obligations and so have deep 
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historical roots. And a safety net is no substitute for a unified system of social 
protection for all Palestinians – but such a system was described by the World 
Bank official I interviewed as “too huge.”
 I must thank the Minister of Social Affairs and the head of the PNCTP in 
the Ministry for a very open and informative interview last month that allowed 
me to see that the Ministry, while adopting and implementing the Program, has 
been able, to some limited extent, to push back at the World Bank and make 
some modifications in the light of the Ministry’s experience and perception of 
Palestinian realities and needs. Most important among these changes are an 
increase in the monthly allocation over the World Bank’s initial proposal and a 
transitional year now underway where special hardship cases are not abandoned 
even if they do not qualify as ultra-poor. Also crucial, the Ministry relies on social 
workers and community advice to target poor households that may be “errors 
of exclusion,” particularly small elderly households where “common sense” says 
they need support but the survey instrument – which has a bias towards large 
households – excludes them. This is quite important given the great fluctuations 
in the fortunes of Palestinian households produced by serial crises and Occupation 
policies. It is interesting to note that the instrument used to measure extreme 
poverty, proxy means testing, was described by a Bank economist in another 
context as most suitable for “chronic poverty” but is “insensitive to quick changes 
in household welfare.” (World Bank 2011) – surely a weakness in our highly 
insecure context.
But most important is the Ministry’s vision, at least under the current Minister, 
that this limited program for the ultra-poor is part of a larger strategy of social 
security and protection –a lynchpin in the social contract. In this, the Minister, 
perhaps with conscious intent, is going beyond the framework of the Palestinian 
Authority, to envision a universal social security system “from the cradle to the 
grave.” Citing the social security law drafted by a Palestinian NGO (Muwatin), 
she nonetheless acknowledges that such legislation requires not just a united 
political system and a working parliament but also public and political will.
This vision is much more comprehensive than that of the Palestinian Reform 
and Development Plan (PNA 2007)– dominated by security concerns – and most 
recently, that of Prime Minister Fayyad’s “Homestretch to Freedom” document of 
August 2010. That document notes an increase the proportion of “the national 
budget that has been allocated to the provision of education, health and social 
protection services” – and indeed 2010 was the first year since 2000 that the PA 
co-financed with donors any proportion of social assistance, a quite remarkable 
indicator of donor dependence. The document goes on to say that “the social safety 
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net has been rationalized to ensure that it addresses the needs of the poor and 
vulnerable.” (PNA 2010,3) But it does not venture beyond the social safety net 
framework, while promising additional allocations such as free school education 
and health insurance to 70,000 ultra poor households. 
For political prisoners, “Homestretch to Freedom” also proposes bureaucratic 
improvements and reform– such as an upgraded database – with some advances in 
welfare and opportunities, particularly for released prisoners, although the intent 
here may be to provide criteria for recruiting into the civil service. from loans 
to 200 ex prisoners for small enterprises to recruiting released prisoners into the 
civil service. There is no mention in any government document of assistance to 
prisoners in the Authority’s own prisons, although the Ministry of Social Affairs 
does provide aid in the form of health kits to Palestinian women prisoners in the 
Authority’s custody. For political prisoners these rather small-scale measures, if 
implemented, can hardly address the strong sentiment among ex-prisoners and 
their families, that prisoners have spent “the best years of their lives” in prison and 
have lost opportunities for education, work and even marriage. The language of 
bureaucratic reform is, as Rema Hammami pointed out in her keynote conference 
presentation, the language of earning sovereignty – it is also a language haunted 
by Oslo, devoid of both the instruments of international law and justice – where 
Israel holding Palestinians inside Israel is in fact illegal and where political 
prisoners should be recognized as such – and of Palestinian national mobilization 
for prisoner’s rights.
The Palestinian National Authority does not seem to have the ability to 
intercede with Israel on behalf of Palestinian prisoners on the issues most pressing 
to them, whether visits, medical treatment, torture and maltreatment or as one 
mother simply said “Freedom.” The institutions that should be responsible for 
prisoners and their families, whether as a “protected” persons under occupation 
( the international community, most immediately the ICRC), as colonial 
subject whose occupier should be bound by international law (Israel), as refugee 
(UNRWA, international community) and as citizens (Palestinian Authority) are 
either unresponsive or unable to respond. 
A Palestinian social contract that does not address this reality will not suffice 
to bind the people to the emerging state or the emerging state to its obligations. 
As one prisoner’s mother in Jenin refugee camp said:
“Our children did nothing wrong. What they did was not for them, but 
for the people. This gives us strength.” 
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